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TEXTUALISM AND JURISDICTION
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to test textualists’ central claims—that their approach is most consistent with
the faithful-agent conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation and more likely to constrain
judges’ capacity to do mischief under the guise of statutory interpretation—by critically examining the
manner in which textualists have interpreted jurisdictional statutes. In addition, it considers descriptive
and normative implications of textualists’ treatment of jurisdictional statutes for the long-standing debate
about the extent of Congress’s authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If textualist
judges are supposed to act as a faithful agents of Congress, following the plain meaning of statutory text,
then when Congress confers jurisdiction without qualification, we would expect textualist judges to
eschew arguments for implicit exceptions to the exercise of jurisdiction. In practice, however, although
the Court’s textualists have strictly read statutes that purport to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction,
they have not been as consistent in relying on the plain language of statutes that appear to confer
expansive grants of jurisdiction. The Court’s textualists’ treatment of jurisdictional statutes suggests that
the textualists’ urge to constrain judicial power has sometimes trumped their competing demand that
courts act as faithful agents of Congress by considering only the plain meaning of statutory language.
This has implications for both textualism and the larger question of the proper relationship between
Congress and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime, and should force textualists to defend their
approach more explicitly as a device for constraining judicial authority.
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CONCLUSION

“[Federal courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
constitution.”
-Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)
INTRODUCTION
Congressional control over federal court jurisdiction is a hot topic once again.1 Last
term, the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s effort to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to
entertain habeas petitions from aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay,2 and the House of
Representatives has recently considered several bills that would strip all federal courts of
jurisdiction to consider various controversial subjects.3 These congressional actions are the latest
skirmishes in a long-standing battle over the proper relationship between Congress and the
federal courts in matters of federal-court jurisdiction.

1

See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of JurisdictionStripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 234-38 (2007) (hereinafter “Pfander, Federal Supremacy”); see also
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take
Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007).
2
Boumediene v. Bush, __ S. Ct. __ (2008) (reviewing Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §
1005(e)(1) & (2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742, to be codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1), and Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636, to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2241(e)(1)).
3
See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over
suits concerning the acknowledgment by a state or federal government entity or officer of “God as the sovereign
source of law, liberty, or government”); Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (depriving federal
courts of jurisdiction over questions pertaining to provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C,
freeing states from an obligation to recognize same-sex marriages entered lawfully in other states); Sanctity of Life
Act of 2005, H.R. 776, 109th Cong. (depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over claims challenging state and local
laws that protect fetuses or regulate abortion); Pledge Protection Act, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (depriving federal
courts of jurisdiction over claims involving the constitutionality of the pledge of allegiance). The House passed the
Pledge Protection Act on May 17, 2005, but the Senate did not take up the bill.
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For a long time, the jurisdiction-stripping debate has remained largely academic because
the Court has largely avoided it. But as an academic debate, it has been quite heated, pitting
proponents of the traditional view that Congress has virtually plenary power over the jurisdiction
of the federal courts4 against proponents of various theories of mandatory jurisdiction, which if
nothing else impose substantial limits on Congress’s power to deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction over certain matters.5 The debate over the power of courts to decline to exercise
jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has conferred has been equally robust. On one side are
advocates of the strong congressional-control view, which holds that the separation of powers
and the notion of legislative supremacy prevent the courts from abstaining from the exercise of
congressionally conferred jurisdiction.6 An opposing group of scholars argue that courts both
traditionally have exercised, and ought to exercise, substantial discretion in matters of
jurisdiction.7

The divergent views on the virtues and validity of jurisdiction-stripping and

judicial abstention stem directly from competing visions of the appropriate relationship between
Congress and the federal courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.

4

See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030
(1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1997); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power
to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External
Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1001 (1965); see infra Part I. Although the scholars in this camp have argued that Congress has essentially plenary
authority, many of them have urged Congress to refrain from exercising its broad power. See Bator, supra note 4, at
1037–38; Gunther, supra note 4, at 909–10.
5
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206, 229–30 (1985); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 498, 504-13 (1974); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 66 (1981); see infra Part I. Still others have offered something of a middle
ground, developing a dialogic model for federal jurisdiction under which Congress and the courts engage in a
lengthy conversation about the appropriate boundaries for the courts’ jurisdiction. See Barry Friedman, A Different
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (hereinafter,
“Friedman, A Different Dialogue”); cf. James E. Pfander Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for
a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 154–160 (1999) (hereinafter “Supplemental Jurisdiction”)
(arguing for role for judicial discretion in crafting a jurisdictional regime).
6
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE.
L.J. 71 (1974) (hereinafter, “Redish, Abstention”).
7
See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (hereinafter, “Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion”).
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Since the debate over congressional control of federal jurisdiction last flared in full
8

force, there has been a revolution in methodological approaches to statutory interpretation.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, several prominent judges and scholars urged courts to accept
textualism as the only proper methodology for interpreting statutes.9 Textualism posits that
courts are bound by a statute’s plain meaning, and that consideration of legislative history, spirit,
or purpose is inappropriate in attempting to discern statutory meaning.
Like the debate over congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, the debate over
textualism is largely about the courts’ relationship to Congress. The textualist approach derives
from various legal traditions. On its surface, textualism echoes the “plain-meaning” school of
interpretation that was dominant in the nineteenth century, but modern textualists have
developed a much richer account of the judicial role in interpreting statutes. Although textualists
draw on legal realism’s insights about the fictions of collective intent or purpose, they envision a
much narrower judicial role than did the legal realists. Indeed, modern textualism is offered as a
response to the perceived excesses of purposivism, which often appeared to be a simple guise for
judges to produce results with which they personally agreed. Accordingly, textualists defend
their approach by arguing that it meaningfully constrains judges.10 Textualists insist that in
interpreting statutes, courts should act as faithful agents of Congress, treating the language of the
statute as the legislative instructions that they are bound to follow.11 Any other approach to
interpretation, they assert, undermines the rule of law and legislative supremacy.
Textualism might not be the dominant approach to statutory interpretation among
academics or judges generally,12 but it appears that several justices—clearly Justice Scalia and
Thomas, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy—on the Supreme

8

Some of the most provocative thinking about Congress’s power over federal-court jurisdiction took place in the
early- to mid-1980s, after Congress considered scores of proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over
various controversial issues. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 5; Amar, supra note 5.
9
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14-37
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 61, 68 (1994)
10
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006); Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 79 (2000); Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning,
91 VA. L. REV. 451, 455 (2005).
11
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2001);
Molot, supra note 10, at 6–29.
12
See Molot, supra note 10, at 29.
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Court now consider themselves textualists.13 (I will employ the term “the Court’s textualists” to
refer to these five Justices.) More important, textualism has had a significant influence on both
judicial decision-making and the on-going scholarly debate over the appropriate judicial role in
statutory interpretation. As a result, comparatively few judges and scholars now openly advance
the strong purposivist approach to statutory interpretation that once prevailed. In the aftermath
of textualism’s rise, even non-textualists concede that they think more about text, proclaim their
waryiness of legislative history, and express sympathy to the call for constraints on the judicial
role in statutory interpretation.14
The influence of textualism on how jurists think about the courts’ relationship to
Congress demands a reevaluation of the competing perspectives on the proper roles of Congress
and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime. In light of this influence, we would expect to
see, at least as a positive matter, more strict interpretation of jurisdictional statutes, and a
vindication, at least as a descriptive matter, for the strong congressional-control models. After
all, if the textualist judge is supposed to act as a faithful agent of Congress by following the plain
meaning of statutory text, then when Congress plainly withdraws jurisdiction, faithfully

13

Justice Scalia is a self-professed textualist, see Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 9, at 23-25, as is Justice
Thomas, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007). Justice Kennedy has given indications recently that
he is inclined towards textualist approaches to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It is somewhat less
clear whether Justice Alito considers himself a textualist. There are some indications that he does, see Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 350 ( 2006) (“When I interpret
statutes—and that’s something that I do with some frequency on the Court of Appeals—where I start and often
where I end is with the text of the statute. And if you do that, I think you eliminate a lot of problems involving
legislative history and also with signing statements.”); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (Alito, J.); Telltabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2516 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); BP America Prod. Corp. v.
Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006), but also some evidence that he does not; he joined Justice Souter’s arguably nontextualist partial dissent in Limtiaco v. Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413 (2007), and in Zuni Public School District No. 89
v. Department of Education, 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007), he declined to join Justice Scalia’s textualist dissent. It is also
unclear whether Justice Roberts considers himself a textualist, see, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John Roberts to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 319-20 (2005) (stating some willingness to consider legislative history in certain
circumstances), but in his short time on the bench he has generally joined opinions by the Court’s textualists, see,
e.g., Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J.); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Serv.,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.); Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007)
(Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.). Some commentators have already concluded that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito effectively are textualists. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, In re Nuitjen: Patentable Subject Matter,
Textualism
and
the
Supreme
Court,
PATENTLY-O
(2007),
available
at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/DuffyOnNuijten.pdf (last visited August 13, 2007); Julia K. Stronks, Breyer v.
Scalia: Will Alito Be an Activist or a Textualist?, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006).
14
Molot, supra note 10, at 3–4.
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textualist judges can be expected to decline to exercise authority; and if Congress confers
jurisdiction without qualification, then we would expect textualist judges—putting aside, for a
moment, the any constraints imposed by judicial precedent or canons of construction—to eschew
arguments for implicit exceptions to the exercise of jurisdiction. Yet in practice, textualism’s
impact on the relationship between Congress and the courts in crafting the jurisdictional regime
has been more uneven.
To be sure, in recent years, textualists have often offered plain-meaning constructions of
jurisdictional statutes. But the Court’s textualist Justices have been considerably more willing to
apply strict textualist approaches to jurisdictional statutes that limit, rather than expand, federalcourt jurisdiction. For example, the Court’s textualist Justices have strictly construed the habeas
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which limit the power of
federal courts to entertain habeas petitions, even though for the twenty years preceding that
statute’s enactment the Court had regularly announced extra-textual limitations on the courts’
habeas jurisdiction under the older habeas statute. But textualism has not yet had a similarly
profound impact on the judicial construction of jurisdictional statutes that by their terms do not
admit of clear exceptions. The Court’s textualist Justices have continued to find extra-textual
reasons to decline to exercise jurisdiction under those statutes.
Indeed, courts often interpret jurisdictional statutes based on something other than plain
statutory language. The diversity statute contains no exception for cases involving family law or
probate, but the Court has excepted such cases from the statutory grant of jurisdiction.15 The
federal question statute is almost identical to Article III’s grant of “arising under” jurisdiction,
yet the Court has implied a well-pleaded complaint rule for the former but not for the latter.16
And although that statute says nothing about abstention in certain classes of cases,17 the Court
has departed from statutory text on several notable occasions in developing its abstention
doctrines.18

15

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
Rivet v. Regents Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
17
Indeed, a different statute does, and that statute is limited to particular, congressionally defined categories of
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.”).
18
See, e.g., Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
16

6

The rise of the “new textualism”19 has not had a significant impact on the interpretation
of these statutes. To be sure, many of the general grants of jurisdiction are old, and judicial
interpretations are deeply ensconced in the jurisdictional regime; it is unrealistic to expect even a
revolution in interpretive methodology to dislodge settled interpretations of statutory text, as the
force of stare decisis is particularly strong in the context of statutory interpretation.20

In

addition, there are other reasons—such as federalism and comity to state courts—why the Court
has continued to decline to exercise jurisdiction that Congress appears to have granted in the
plain text of its enactments. But as it turns out, these reasons are at best only part of the
explanation for why textualism has not fully vindicated the congressional-control model of
federal jurisdiction.
In practice, textualism’s application in the jurisdictional context has put its principal aims
at war with each other. Textualism’s proponents advance two principal claims in support of the
approach. First, they argue that the concepts of legislative supremacy and the faithful agency of
courts to Congress require judges to give force only to the text of statutes, as opposed to other,
more malleable indications of legislative purpose.21 Second, they assert that this approach more
effectively constrains the power of judges, which should be limited in a democratic society.22 As
applied in most contexts, the textualists’ strict adherence to statutory text in determining
statutory meaning effectuates both the specific goal of ensuring faithful agency and the more
general goal of constraining judicial authority. But in the context of jurisdictional statutes, being
a faithful agent of Congress, as determined by plain statutory text, often requires an expansion
of, rather than a limitation on, judicial power. Read according to their plain text, most of the
principal statutory jurisdictional grants would require the federal courts to assume jurisdiction in
a much broader class of cases than they currently do under decidedly atextual readings of the
statutes. Textualism is largely about the properly limited judicial role in a democratic society,

800 (1976). In announcing its abstention doctrines, the relevant jurisdiction-granting statute has usually been 28
U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question statute.
19
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
20
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 (1989).
21
Scalia, supra note 9, at 17 (“Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind
us.”).
22
See, e.g., Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 63 (“We are supposed to be faithful agents,
not independent principals. Having a wide field to play—not only the statute but also the debates, not only the rules
but also the values they advance, and so on—liberates judges. This is objectionable on grounds of democratic theory
as well as on grounds of predictability.”); infra Part II.
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but being a truly faithful agent in the jurisdictional context would often require a less limited role
for the courts than some textualists might otherwise prefer. It turns out that the textualists’ urge
to constrain judicial power has often trumped the textualists’ demand that courts act as faithful
agents of Congress by considering only the plain meaning of statutory language in deciphering
Congress’s instructions.
My point is not that textualism’s somewhat erratic application in the context of
jurisdictional statutes necessarily undermines textualism’s normative appeal. There are powerful
arguments—constitutional, institutional, and otherwise—for limiting judicial power, and the
Court’s recent interpretations of jurisdictional statutes can be justified on these grounds. But the
account that I develop here does suggest that, contrary to textualists’ frequent claims, textualism
in practice has sometimes been less about fidelity to Congress’s legislative supremacy and more
about constraining judicial authority. This may or may not be fatal for textualism, but it should
force proponents of the approach to defend the theory more explicitly on those terms, rather than
as a methodology for more accurately divining congressional intent.23 Equally important, the
selective application of textualism suggests that the long-standing question about the proper
relationship between Congress and the federal courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime is, in an
era of the textualist ascendancy, a considerably more nuanced question than one might expect at
first blush.
In Part I of this article, I provide a brief overview of the long-standing debate over the
relationship between Congress and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime. In Part II, I
discuss textualists’ claims about statutory interpretation, focusing on the faithful-agent account
of the judicial role and on textualists’ claims that their methodology better constrains judicial
discretion. In Part III, I canvass the current jurisdictional regime, focusing on when (and how)
judicial interpretations of jurisdictional statutes follow plain statutory text, and when (and how)
they depart from it. Finally, in Part IV I address why the rise of textualism has not produced a
markedly different judicial approach to construing expansive jurisdictional statutes, and what this
state of affairs suggests more generally about both textualism and the broader debate about the
relationship between Congress and the courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime. I conclude by
arguing that the Court’s selective application of textualism to limit federal-court jurisdiction
23

Cf. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1475 (2007) (arguing that textualists accept various
fictions about the legislative process in order to operationalize a theory of judicial restraint).
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suggests that, at least as a descriptive matter, the strong congressional-control models fail fully to
capture the law governing federal-court jurisdiction.

I. CRAFTING A JURISDICTIONAL REGIME: CONGRESS AND THE COURTS
Academics have enthusiastically discussed the extent of Congress’s authority to control
the jurisdiction of the federal courts at least since Henry Hart’s famous “Dialogue.”24 The debate
has addressed both Congress’s power to strip the federal courts—either lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court in its appellate capacity, or both—of jurisdiction and the federal courts’ authority
to decline to exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has granted. The literature on these
questions is voluminous; I provide a brief overview below.

A. Congress’s Authority to Deprive the Federal Courts of Jurisdiction
The issue of jurisdiction-stripping—that is, of Congress’s power to divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction over particular matters—actually embraces two separate, though related,
questions: Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and Congress’s
power to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The traditional view is that
Congress’s power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is plenary. Article III, after
all, leaves to Congress the decision whether to create lower federal courts in the first instance.25
The records of the Constitutional Convention make clear that this provision was the product of a
compromise between those who thought that federal courts were necessary for the vindication of
federal rights and those who thought that state courts were adequate for all claims.26 The
traditional argument is straightforward: If, as Paul Bator argued, Congress is free to decide that
there should be no lower federal courts at all, then Congress must have authority to create them
while limiting their jurisdiction.27

24

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
25
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 (vesting the “judicial Power” in “one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); see Gunther, supra note 4, at 912.
26
See 1 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25 (1937); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E.
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a
New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52-56 (1975).
27
Bator, supra note 4, at 1030-31.
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The traditional view is thus based, at least in part, on the intuition that the greater power
includes the lesser.28 It also relies on an argument—grounded in constitutional text, history, and
structure—that if the question of access to the lower federal courts “should be left [as] a matter
of political and legislative judgment,” then it makes no sense to conclude that Congress’s only
authority is the “all-or-nothing power to decide whether none or all of the cases to which the
federal judicial power extends need the haven of a lower federal court.”29 Proponents of the
traditional view also point out that Congress, starting with the Judiciary Act of 1789, has
consistently assumed that it has power to decide which controversies should be litigated in the
first instance in the lower federal courts, and that the federal courts have generally endorsed this
view.30 Advocates of the traditional view do not deny that there may be some constitutional
limits on Congress’s power to strip the lower federal courts of jurisdiction, but they generally
have contended that those limits do not inhere in Article III but instead should be inferred from
other constitutional provisions.31
Under the conventional view, Congress’s power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction is similarly broad. The “Exceptions Clause” of Article III provides that in most
categories of cases within the judicial power, the Supreme Court “shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.”32 Herbert Wechsler argued that this text compels the conclusion that
“Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by

28

See Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982); But see Bator, supra note 4, at 1031 (disclaiming
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument); Gunther, supra note 4, at 912 (same).
29
Bator, supra note 4, at 1031; accord Gunther, supra note 4, at 912 (“It is certainly difficult to argue that lower
federal courts must be available to adjudicate federal claims when the explicit language of Article III, and the central
point of the Constitutional Convention’s compromise, was to leave the establishment of lower federal tribunals to
the discretion of Congress.”). For a hyper-textualist defense of the traditional view, see Harrison, supra note 4, at
209-50.
30
See Bator, supra note 4, at 1031-33; Gunther, supra note 4, at 913; e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850);
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973).
31
Such “external” restraints—as opposed to “internal” restraints, which arguably are implied by Article III itself,
see Gunther, supra note 4, at 900—would include a prohibition on federal laws limiting access to the lower federal
courts on the basis of race. See id. at 916; Bator, supra note 4, at 1034. In addition, Martin Redish has argued that
the Due Process Clause might require a federal forum in cases seeking judicial relief for the unlawful actions of
federal officers, because the principle of Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), and related cases makes the
state courts unavailable in many such actions. See Redish & Woods, supra note 26, at 49–52.
32
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

10

delimitations of . . . the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”33

Wechsler and other

luminaries in the field of federal courts—including Paul Bator, Gerald Gunther, William Van
Alstyne, and Martin Redish—have concluded, based on text,34 history,35 congressional
practice,36 and judicial precedent,37 that Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause is
plenary. Advocates of the traditional view of Congress’s power to limit the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction emphasize that although Congress’s power is broad, the power is subject to
powerful political and practical limits, and that, generally speaking, Congress would be unwise
to exercise the power.38
Under the traditional view, therefore, Congress has considerable—if not unlimited—
power to deprive the lower federal courts of jurisdiction and to strip the Supreme Court of
appellate jurisdiction.

Although this view of Congress’s power to control federal-court

jurisdiction has attracted very prominent adherents over the years, it has been unable to generate
consensus. Henry Hart, for one, famously suggested that Congress lacked the power, under the
Exceptions Clause, to “destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional
plan.”39

Leonard Ratner elaborated on Hart’s “essential functions” thesis, and argued that

Congress cannot deprive the Supreme Court of the ability “to maintain the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law.”40
Several other commentators have viewed the questions of congressional control over the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the lower federal courts together, concluding that
33

Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1005.
Bator, supra note 4, at 1038.
35
Redish, An Internal and External Examination, supra note 4, at 908–11.
36
Gunther, supra note 4, at 906-07.
37
See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Part McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 233-62 (1973);
Gunther, supra note 4, at 904-05.
38
See Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1006–07 (noting that “government cannot be run without the use of courts for the
enforcement of coercive sanctions and within large areas it will be thought that federal tribunals are essential to
administer federal law” and that a “jurisdictional withdrawal . . . might work to freeze the very doctrines that had
prompted its enactment”); Bator, supra note 4, at 1041 (arguing that Congress should not enact laws stripping the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction “not only because they represent bad policy but because they violate the structure and
spirit of the instrument”); Gunther, supra note 4, at 909-12 (“Most of us would strongly prefer to have Congress
express its disaffection with Court rulings by initiating constitutional amendments rather than by chopping off
segments of the Court’s jurisdiction. Invocations of the “exceptions” power would be unseemly and chaotic and
might ultimately damages relations between the Court and the political branches that have worked reasonably well
in our nation’s history.”).
39
Hart, supra note 24, at 1365.
40
Leonard Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court
Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 957 (1982); Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
34
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Congress cannot infringe upon some mandatory core of federal jurisdiction.

Theodore

Eisenberg, for example, argues that the Framers believed that there would be a federal forum for
all cases within the federal judicial power. Further, because Supreme Court review of all cases
within the federal judicial power is simply not feasible anymore, Eisenberg asserts that it would
be inconsistent with the constitutional role of the federal judiciary for Congress to abolish the
lower federal courts today.41 Lawrence Sager asserts that the text, history, and logic of Article
III require that there always be at least one Article III court available to review assertions of
constitutional right,42 and that Congress lacks power selectively to deprive the federal courts of
jurisdiction to review constitutional claims.43 Others have made similar claims based on original
source materials, text, and structure.44 Finally, in a recent article, James Pfander argues that
although Congress’s power to “constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”45 permits
Congress to vest exclusive jurisdiction in state courts over federal claims, the express inferiority
requirement forbids Congress from entirely divesting the Supreme Court of power to review the
judgments of state courts invoking that jurisdiction.46 These related theories of mandatory
federal jurisdiction, in contrast to the traditional view, impose substantial limits on Congress’s
power to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. On these views, albeit to different degrees,
Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts is largely allocative, rather than a
license absolutely to curtail federal jurisdiction.

41

Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 504–13.
Sager, supra note 5, at 66.
43
Id. at 68–77. For a similar argument, see Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 129, 141–46 (1981).
44
Relying on original source materials, Robert Clinton agreed that Congress is required to allocate to the federal
judiciary every type of case listed in Article III. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984). Clinton
argued that there may be an exception for trivial cases, over which Congress need not confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts. See id. at 827–28, 839–40. Akhil Amar offered a variation on this theme, arguing that constitutional
text, history, and structure demonstrate that the Framers believed that some federal court would be available “to hear
and resolve finally any given federal question, admiralty, or public ambassador case,”44 Amar, supra note 5, at 206,
229–30; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499
(1990) (considering the Act as evidence of the Framers’ acceptance of the two-tiered view of federal jurisdiction),
the heads of jurisdiction for which Article III provides that the judicial power “shall extend to all Cases,” U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson recently offered a theory of
mandatory jurisdiction based on a similar reading of the text, and of other provisions of the Constitution. See
Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1.
45
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
46
Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 1; see also Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 1; Laurence Claus, The One
Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007).
42
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At bottom, the debate over Congress’s power to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction
is a question of the proper relationship between Congress and the federal courts. The more one
is committed to the notion of legislative supremacy, the more one is likely to accept the
traditional, congressional-control view. Below I consider what the rise of textualism suggests
about popular commitments to this notion; but first I provide a brief overview of the related
debate over the courts’ authority to decline to exercise power that Congress has granted.

B. The Federal Courts’ Authority to Decline to Exercise Power That Congress Has
Affirmatively Granted
A similar debate has raged over the extent of the federal courts’ power to decline to
exercise jurisdiction that Congress has ostensibly granted. This discourse reflects the same
fundamental theme at issue in the controversy over Congress’s power to deprive the federal
courts of jurisdiction: the degree to which Congress exercises control over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.47 Martin Redish is the principal proponent of a strong congressional-control
model, arguing that “neither total nor partial judge-made abstention is acceptable as a matter of
legal process and separation of powers.”48 Although Redish concedes that the federal courts
“have long assumed the authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction explicitly vested in them by
Congress,”49 he argues that such actions amount to “blatant—and indefensible—usurpation[s] of
legislative authority” that are inconsistent with democratic principles.50 According to Redish’s
vision of the separation of powers, Congress creates jurisdiction, and the courts must exercise it
consistent with Congress’s commands.51
47

See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1234–35 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter, “HART AND WECHSLER’S”).
48
Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 74; accord MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 47-74 (1991).
49
Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 71. Redish addresses both conventional abstention doctrines, id. at 75-80,
and more informal forms of abstention, such as the judicially fashioned probate- and domestic-relations exceptions
to the diversity jurisdiction, id. at 102–04. For a brief discussion of these doctrines, see infra at notes 270–290 and
accompanying text.
50
Redish, Abstention, supra note 6, at 72–74; accord Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1964) (“[J]urisdiction under
our system is rooted in Article III and congressional enactments” and “is not a domain solely within the Court’s
keeping”) (hereinafter, “Gunther, Subtle Vices”).
51
See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the Constitution.”); see also Gunther, Subtle Vices, supra note 50, at 12 (critiquing Alexander Bickel’s
reliance on the “passive virtues”).
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David Shapiro has responded by advancing a more robust role for the courts in crafting a
jurisdictional regime.52 He argues that, as a descriptive matter, judicial discretion in matters of
jurisdiction “is much more pervasive than is generally realized.”53 Indeed, such discretion, he
argues, is “everywhere”54 and does not amount to judicial usurpation, as Redish charged, but
rather is “wholly consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition.”55 Shapiro’s normative
defense goes beyond mere matters of tradition, though; he argues that judicial discretion in
matters of jurisdiction actually strengthens the separation of powers, both horizontally (by
helping to ease interbranch tensions)56 and vertically (by reducing friction with state courts and
state governments).57 On this view, Congress does not lack authority to control the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, but it must act clearly if it seeks to narrow the courts’ presumptive
discretion in matters of jurisdiction.58
The debates over the extent of Congress’s control over the federal courts’ jurisdiction
ultimately cannot be resolved without careful consideration of the appropriate judicial role in our
constitutional system. Although there have been some attempts systematically to consider the
courts’ institutional role vis-à-vis Congress in the jurisdictional context, scholars have generally
told only part of that quite complicated story.59 As I explore in more detail below, theories of
52

See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7.
Id. at 545.
54
Barry Friedman, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Retrospective: Most Influential Articles—David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2000).
55
Shapiro Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 545.
56
Id. at 585-87; see also See Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term – Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1891, 1893 (2004) (hereinafter, “Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited”); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, The
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 396 (critiquing view that Congress can resolve up
front all difficult questions likely to arise in litigation) (hereinafter, “Meltzer, Judicial Passivity”).
57
Shapiro Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 580–85. Barry Friedman has advanced a variation on
Shapiro’s position, arguing that boundaries of federal jurisdiction evolve—and properly evolve—“through a dialogic
process of congressional enactment and judicial response.” Friedman, A Different Dialogue supra note 5, at 2.
58
David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to
“Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1845
(1992).
59
See Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress’ Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1312 (1984) (“[T]he positions that scholars take on the specific
issue of congressional power to restrict jurisdiction frequently are bound up with the scholars’ more general views of
the Constitution’s structure” and the nature of judicial review); Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional
Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J.
2445, 2448 (1998) (describing three “conflicting narrative” of the relationship between Congress and the courts that
emerged from the jurisdiction- and remedy-stripping of the mid-1990s); cf. Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial
Power in a “Unified Judiciary,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2000) (arguing that the various attributes of judicial
power fall into three “allocative categories,” and that Congress has varying power to allocate these attributes among
53
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statutory interpretation are in large part about the relationship between Congress and the courts.
To develop a richer account of Congress’s authority over matters of federal court jurisdiction,
therefore, it is a useful endeavor to consider the interpretive methodology that the courts use in
construing statutes governing jurisdictional matters.
Both fronts in the battle over congressional control of federal jurisdiction, jurisdictionstripping and judicial abstention, last raged in full force in the early- to mid-1980s, shortly before
the ascendancy of textualism. Since then, the rise of textualism has redefined the debate about
the courts’ role in interpreting statutes. Yet the war about the appropriate judicial role in crafting
a jurisdictional regime has been waged without attention to the changes that textualism has
worked in the debate over the judicial role. In light of the textualist revolution, it is time to
update the discussion of the respective roles of Congress and the courts in crafting a
jurisdictional regime.

II. TEXTUALISM AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
For much of the twentieth century, the conventional approaches to statutory interpretation
required a court to determine either what the legislature intended in enacting the relevant statute
or what the animating purposes of that statute were. Because under the former approach,
generally known as “intentionalism,” legislative intent was the touchstone of statutory
interpretation, judges generally considered any source that shed light on the legislature’s intent.60
Under the latter approach, generally known as “purposivism,” and exemplified by the Hart and
Sacks “legal process” school, courts read statutory language in light of the (often unarticulated)
purposes that animated the statute.61 Obviously, in pursuit of the goals of these inquiries,

the federal courts); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 884 (1998) (arguing that there are five
qualities constituting the “judicial Power,” and that they are the principal means for keeping federal law supreme
over contrary state law in cases in which Congress confers jurisdiction); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping
and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2000) (arguing that
“the constitutional requirement of ‘supremacy’ may leave Congress free to fashion exceptions and regulations to the
Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction, but limit its ability to couple such regulations with restrictions on the
Court’s supervisory role that would threaten the constitutional requirement of lower federal court ‘inferiority’ to the
one ‘supreme’ court specified in Article III.”).
60
See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 19, at 626-40.
61
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also T. Alexander
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statutory language was important and often decisive for both intentionalists and purposivists,62
but it was not the sole focus of the interpretive inquiry. Under either approach, it was possible in
theory for some source, such as legislative history or apparent spirit or purpose, to trump the
statutory text, and this occasionally occurred in practice.63 Intentionalism and purposivism
proceeded from the premise of legislative supremacy: If, in a constitutional democracy, judges
must be faithful agents of Congress, then judges must attempt to decipher as accurately as
possible Congress’s statutory instructions.64
Textualism, in contrast, is an approach to statutory interpretation that accords dispositive
weight to the meaning of the statutory text. It maintains that in interpreting statutes, courts must
“seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted text, understood in context.”65 The
approach is thus closely identified with Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous claim that “[w]e do not
inquire into what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”66 Justice Scalia,
the leading modern proponent of textualism, has explained that the touchstone for the modern
textualist’s inquiry is “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”67 Because
the meaning of the text, rather than Congress’s subjective intent in enacting the statute, is the
proper focus, textualist judges generally refuse to treat legislative history as an authoritative

Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 26–28 (1988) (associating legal process
approach with intentionalist theories of statutory interpretation).
62
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the
function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”);
HART & SACKS, supra note 61, at 1374-80 (arguing that a court should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute . . .so as
to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the words . . . a meaning they will
not bear”).
63
See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“We may... look to the reason of the enactment and
inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if
necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.”); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 19, at 628 & n. 25 (“In a significant number of cases,
the Court has pretty much admitted that it was displacing plain meaning with apparent legislative intent or purpose
gleaned from legislative history”; collecting cases).
64
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 325–39 (1990).
65
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (hereinafter “Manning,
Legislative Intent”).
66
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L .REV. 417, 419 (1899).
67
Scalia, supra note 9, at 17.
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indication of legislative intent.68 For the same reason, textualists will not elevate the purposes or
spirit of a statute over its text.69
Like intentionalism and purposivism, textualism is premised on the notion of legislative
supremacy, and on the corollary that the courts must act, in a constitutional democracy, as the
faithful agents of the legislature.70 Textualists depart from intentionalists and purposivists,
however, in their views of the legislative process, the notion of legislative intent, and the
judiciary’s relationship to Congress.71 First, textualists have relied on the insights of public
choice theory in arguing that because many statutes simply reflect bargains struck among interest
groups competing for favorable treatment, departure from the statutory text threatens to disturb
the legislative compromise.72

Second, textualists draw on social choice theory73 and legal

realism74 in arguing that the concept of a collective, unexpressed legislative intent is illusory.
Together, these insights suggest that Congress has no single, identifiable intent, and that statutes
have no single, identifiable purpose.75

Third, textualists argue that the Constitution’s

institutional structure has implications for the judicial role in statutory interpretation. Only the
text of statute, not its legislative history or underlying purposes, is enacted into law with the
requisite participation by both Houses of Congress and the President. Accordingly, to elevate
68

See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684-89 (1997)
(hereinafter, “Manning, Non-Delegation”).
69
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 9, at 23; Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 420.
70
See Scalia, supra note 9, at 17, 22; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 15-21 (2001); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 371-72 (2005) (hereinafter “Nelson,
What is Textualism”).
71
In focusing on textualism and intentionalism here, I do not mean to suggest that there are no other approaches to
statutory interpretation. Instead, I discuss intentionalism to provide a richer account of textualism, which responded
largely to intentionalist approaches. For other approaches to statutory interpretation, see, e.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 116–18 (1994) (discussing doctrine of “the equity of the
statute”); R ICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 267–87 (1985) (discussing “imaginative
reconstruction” of statutes); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 (1982) (arguing for a
common-law function of courts to “see[] to it that the law is kept up to date”).
72
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (1984); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (hereinafter “Easterbook, Statutes’
Domains”); see generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
73
See Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 68; Kenneth Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” not
an “It”; Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). For social choice theory, see
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2–4 (2d ed. 1963).
74
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 372 (1990); Eskridge, New
Textualism, supra note 19, at 642–43; Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 68. For the classic
statement of the legal realists’ view of legislative intent, see Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
863 (1930).
75
See Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 72, at 536; Molot, supra note 10, at 25.
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legislative history or unexpressed statutory purpose over statutory language ignores the
constitutionally prescribed procedures for lawmaking and impermissibly aggrandizes the courts’
role.76 Textualists’ refusal to treat legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative
intent77 or to elevate the spirit of a law over its letter78 flow naturally from these theoretical
premises.79
Modern textualism arose in large part as a response to the perceived excesses of
intentionalism and purposivism, and to the perceived activism of the Court in matters of statutory
interpretation.80

But textualism is not merely reactive; its proponents have offered a coherent

approach with strong theoretical bases. Textualists have argued that only their approach is
ultimately consistent with the notion of faithful agency, with legislative supremacy, and the rule
of law itself. Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that “it is simply incompatible with
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law
determined by what the lawmaker meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”81 On
this view, reliance on sources other than statutory text is “tyrannical,” because it “is the law that
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”82
But the core of textualism’s normative appeal lies in its claims about the judicial role and
the dangers of judicial law-making.83 As Justice Scalia explained, “being bound by genuine but
unexpressed legislative intent rather than the law is only the theoretical threat” of non-textualist
approaches to statutory interpretation; the “practical,” and more immediate, threat is that “under
76

See, e.g, Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–18, 21–22; Manning, Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 68, at 695–99;
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure, supra note 9, at 63.
77
Scalia, supra note 9, at 29–36; Manning, Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 68 at 684–90.
78
Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–23; Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 420.
79
See Scalia, supra note 9, at 17 (“Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind
us.”).
80
See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists and Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76 (2006)
(hereinafter “Manning, Textualists and Purposivists”) (“[T]extualism originated in reaction to the Court’s
traditional (and perhaps anachronistic) understanding of purposivism.”); Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor
Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 455 (2005); Molot, supra note 10, at 25; Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025–32 (1998). For arguments that theories of
statutory interpretation are cyclical, see Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
149 (2001); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO
L. REV. 799 (1985); cf. Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2004, at 149, 149 (“When the ideological valence of Supreme Court decisions shifts, constitutional theorizing about
judicial review tends to shift as well.”).
81
Scalia, supra note 9 at 17.
82
Id.
83
See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2435 (2003) (describing the “rule-of-law
objectives implicit in the Constitution’s strict separation of lawmaking from judging.”).

18

the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”84 In elevating statutory language over
legislative history and statutory purposes by limiting the range of potentially ambiguous sources
to which judges can properly refer, textualists hope to “constrain the tendency of judges to
substitute their will for that of Congress.”85 Moreover, it is not simply the limited range of
permissible sources for discerning statutory meaning that constrains textualist judges; as Caleb
Nelson recently argued, “textualism can be seen as a more rule-based method of ascertaining
what the enacting legislature probably meant,”86 harnessing the constraining power of rules
while evading the discretion-conferring qualities of standards.87
Of course, there is a lively debate over whether textualism is more successful than other
approaches to statutory interpretation at constraining judicial willfulness,88 and over whether
84

Scalia, supra note 9, at 17–18; see id. at 18 (calling “legislative intent” a “handy cover for judicial intent”); id. at
21 (calling purposivism “an invitation to judicial lawmaking”).
85
Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 19, at 674; accord William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism: The Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1528–31 (1998) (hereinafter “Eskridge, Unknown Ideal”) (“According to the new
textualists, consideration of legislative history creates greater opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion.”);
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 72, at 551 (“[E]ven the best intentioned [judges] will find that the
imagined dialogues of departed legislators have much in common with their own conceptions of the good.”); Molot,
supra note 10, at 26; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989)
(“[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor . . . form which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement
appears uncomfortably like legislation.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: And
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1086–87 (1992) (“Textualists argue that the potentially wide array of
originalist sources (especially legislative history) gives judges the freedom to justify (and hide) any policy
decision.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1309-10 (1990) (“The Textualist fears that with this wealth
of materials a court sift through the legislative history to reach results-oriented decisions.”).
86
Nelson, What Is Textualism, supra note 70 at 377. Nelson relies on textualists’ rule-like stances with respect to
legislative history, id. at 377, drafting errors, id. at 377–83, and canons of construction, id. at 383–98, and their
willingness to embrace rule-like directives from Congress, id. at 398–403. See also id. at 98 (“[P]art of what drives
textualists toward rules in the first place is their skepticism about judges’ abilities to apply an underlying
justification consistently from case to case.”); Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 72, at 536 (“[U]nless . . .
the community is willing to entrust almost boundless discretion to judges as oracles of the community’s standards[,]
there is a need for some broader set of rules about when to engage in the open-ended process of construction.”).
87
See Nelson, What is Textualism, supra note 70, at 374–75; see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 51–52 (1991);
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
88
Molot, supra note 10, at 48–50 (“[A]s textualist scholars and judges begin to believe that textualist tools can be
employed not just to resolve statutory ambiguity, but also to eliminate it, the opportunities for judicial creativity and
abuse increase dramatically.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative States, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779–780 (1995) (suggesting that
Court’s textualist approach might be influenced by the “ideological composition of the Executive and Judicial
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textualism is more likely to effectuate the faithful agent theory of the judicial role in statutory
interpretation.89

Recent commentators, moreover, have argued that textualism and

intentionalism in practice might not be as different as textualist critics maintain90—or at least that
they might not be different for the reasons that textualists claim.91 In any event, textualism has
had an undeniably powerful impact on both legal scholarship and judicial decision-making.
Just ten years ago, Justice Scalia lamented that legal scholarship “has been seemingly
agnostic as to whether there is even any such thing as good or bad rules of statutory
interpretation,” and that there “are few law-school courses on the subject, and certainly no
required ones.”92

Today, in contrast, classes in statutory interpretation or legislation are

commonplace at law schools, and many top programs have required first-year students to take a
course that focuses on the positivization of law in the regulatory state.93 The rise of textualism is
in part responsible for these changes. To be sure, textualism remains somewhat unfashionable in
academic circles—which, William Eskridge has noted, tend to be “a haven for the contextually
Branches”); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1998)
(“[W]e might conclude that the failure to consult legislative history is actually the more activist move, for it gives
the judge more power to shape the policy objectives of the statute unilaterally, unconstrained by policy priorities or
goals that may have been expressed by legislators. Indeed, from the standpoint of judicial activism concerns, there is
something perverse about a rule that would license judges to invoke policy considerations of their own making,
secondary sources, and canons of construction, yet prohibit them from distilling and considering what relevant
policy concerns may appear in the deliberative record generated by the legislators who drafted and debated the
bill.”); Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 85, at 1522 (noting that the “debating history of federal statutes, most
of which were enacted by Democratic Congresses,” is slanted “in a more regulatory-state direction,” and that
textualism’s approach to legislative history might be a “politically conservative move by courts”); cf. Nelson, What
Is Textualism, supra note 70, at 373 (“[T]oday’s textualists tend to be politically conservative, and the complex of
attitudes that they draw upon in resolving close cases may well color what we think of as ‘textualism.’”); Martin H.
Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism
in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 819 (1994) (“[N]ew textualism effectively opens the door to
seemingly unlimited judicial interpretive discretion every time an ambiguity is found to exist.”).
89
Molot, supra note 10, at 53 (“[A]ggressive textualism tends to enhance the judiciary’s role vis-à-vis Congress.
The creativity that aggressive textualism fosters in judges makes them look less like faithful agents of Congress and
more like coequal partners.”); Schacter, supra note 88, at 39 (“[A] judicial decision to categorically disregard
legislative history is, after all, a judicial decision about who decides what is relevant to statutory meaning, and is, in
that sense, difficult to reconcile with a strong conception of judicial restraint.”); Redish & Chung, supra note 88, at
806 (“By generally confining an interpreting judge to text, new textualism leaves an interpreter without guidance in
the numerous cases when the application of text to a specific fact situation is ambiguous or unclear.”).
90
Molot, supra note 10, at 3–4. But see Manning, Textualists and Purposivists, supra note 80, at 91–109.
91
Nelson, What Is Textualism, supra note 70, at 348–51. But see Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at
423–24.
92
Scalia, COMMON-LAW COURTS, supra note 9, at 14–15.
93
Harvard Law School, for example, now requires first-year students to take a course in Legislation and Regulation,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/admissions/jd/about/curriculum/ (last visited June 25, 2007), and Columbia offers a
similar class as an elective to first-year students, http://www.law.columbia.edu/jd_applicants/curriculum/1l (last
visited July 22, 2008). These courses typically provide a heavy dose of textualism, among other approaches.
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inclined”94—and it is probably not the dominant approach to statutory interpretation among
judges generally.95 But there are indications that several—and perhaps even a majority of—
Justices on the United States Supreme Court now consider themselves textualists.96

More

important, the ranks of textualists surely have grown since the theory’s emergence in the 1980s,
and textualism has undoubtedly had a profound influence on both judicial decision-making and
the on-going scholarly debate over the appropriate judicial role in statutory interpretation.
Textualism has shaped the way in which even non-textualist Justices on the Supreme Court write
their opinions, and very few judges and scholars today advance the strong purposivist approach
to statutory interpretation that once dominated in the academy.97 As Jon Molot has argued,
textualism “seems to have been so successful . . . that [now] we are all textualists in an important
sense.”98
In this article, I focus on the textualists’ two principal claims: (1) that their approach is
most consistent with the faithful-agent conception of the judicial role in statutory interpretation;
and (2) that their approach is more likely to constrain the capacity of judges to do mischief under
the guise of statutory interpretation. In the sections that follow, I seek to test these claims by
considering the manner in which textualists have interpreted jurisdictional statutes. I then draw
upon both the descriptive and normative implications of the textualists’ treatment of
jurisdictional statutes in order to update the long-standing debate about the extent of Congress’s
authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

III. THE CURRENT FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REGIME
If the congressional-control model of federal court jurisdiction were entirely accurate as a
positive matter, then, in matters of federal jurisdiction, that Congress would legislate the proper
boundaries of judicial cognizance and the courts would respond by faithfully following
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Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 85 , at 1513.
Molot, supra note 10, at 29.
96
See supra note 13.
97
Non-textualist judges, for example, are considerably more likely today to cite dictionary meanings—a common
tool of the trade for textualists, see Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity:
Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 893 (2008)—in the course of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2008) (Breyer, J.).
98
Molot, supra note 10, at 43; Siegel, supra note 80, at 1057.
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Congress’s mandates—regardless of whether Congress restricts or enlarges99 the courts’
jurisdiction. However, the actual law of federal jurisdiction is a confusing blend of statutes and
judicial decisions, some of which purport to interpret statutes and others of which appear to be
tantamount to common-law decisions. In some contexts, Congress has led and the courts have
followed;100 in others, the courts have led, and Congress has followed;101 in still others, the
courts have acted without any congressional involvement.102

In many cases, although the

jurisdictional statutes are brief and straightforward, court-made jurisdictional doctrine is complex
and based upon something other than plain text.103
With the ascendancy of textualism, one might expect this pattern to change. As faithful
agents of Congress, with the principal’s instructions embodied in the plain text of its enactments,
courts applying a textualist approach to jurisdictional questions presumably should treat the plain
language of jurisdictional statutes as dispositive in deciding matters of federal jurisdiction. The
normative force of the textualist critique, after all, derives from its assertion about the
“uncomfortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy,” a problem that is
particularly acute in the statutory context.104 Perhaps, therefore, we would expect a textualist
judge to decline to find implicit exceptions to a statute that plainly provides, for example, that the
district court “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions” arising under federal law.105
Yet this has not exactly been the case. Instead, the Court’s textualist Justices have
frequently interpreted jurisdictional statutes according to something other than the plain meaning
of their statutory text.

This is not to say that those Justices have consistently interpreted

99

Assuming, of course, no constitutional limits on Congress’s power to do so. See, e.g, Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (declaring unconstitutional provision of Judiciary Act of 1789 purporting to expand
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that defined in Article III).
100
For example, Congress statutorily established an amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases, and the
courts have developed a complicated set of rules to implement the requirement.
101
For interpretive problems that arise when Congress enacts statutory reforms that parallel judicial
reinterpretations of existing laws, see Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1997).
102
See generally Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7 .
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Again, consider the aggregation rules that the courts have developed to determine whether the amount-incontroversy requirement is satisfied in a diversity case. See Friedenthal, Kane & Miller, Civil Procedure § 2.9 (4th
ed. 2005).
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Scalia, COMMON-LAW COURTS, supra note 9, at 10; see id. at 17-18 (criticizing intentionalism because of the
threat that “common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field”).
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28 U.S.C. § 1331 (emphasis added).
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jurisdictional statutes atextually; to the contrary, there are many recent cases in which the
Court’s textualists have appeared to apply a rigidly textualist approach to jurisdictional statutes.
But in recent years the Court’s textualist Justices have consistently tended to construe
jurisdictional statutes in a textualist fashion only when the statutes restrict, rather than expand,
federal-court jurisdiction.
In other words, the Court has continued, and perhaps accelerated, a project of narrowing
the jurisdiction of the federal courts that it began about 35 years ago. The Court has carried out
this project through its construction of jurisdictional statutes, and also by elaborating on
doctrines, such as standing106 or state sovereign immunity,107 that are grounded in Article III or
other constitutional provisions.

As Judith Resnik has argued,108 there also are explicit

indications, wholly aside from the Court’s formal decision-making, of the Court’s desire in
recent years to limit federal-court jurisdiction, such as the Judicial Conference’s Long Range
Plan for the Federal Courts109 and the Chief Justice’s annual report in 1997.110

Contrary to the

concern of many commentators in the early 1980s, “in both case law and commentary, the
federal judiciary has recently warned Congress to be wary of giving jurisdiction to federal judges
and has said nothing to signal concern about the prospect of taking away federal jurisdiction.”111
Louise Weinberg has echoed this concern, arguing that the debate about congressional
control over federal court jurisdiction ignores “the reality that it is the Supreme Court rather than
Congress that is the more active agent in denials of access to courts.”112 Professor Weinberg
suggests that the Court’s move to limit federal court jurisdiction reflects hostility to plaintiffs,
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See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 127
S. Ct. 2553 (2007); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1464–71 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
261 (1997).
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Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered
Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2626–27 (1998) (“In the 1990s . . . federal judges are more often than not
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curtailed.”).
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JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (as approved by
the Judicial Conference, Dec. 1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995) (arguing for limits on federal jurisdiction,
for no new “federalization of crime,” and for the creation of fewer new causes of action).
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William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted at 30 T HIRD BRANCH, at 1
(Jan. 1998).
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Courts,” 78 T EX. L. REV. 1405, 1406–07 (2000).
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litigation, and courts themselves, amounting to a form of “judicial self-loathing.”113 One need
not be as cynical as Professor Weinberg about the Court’s motivation to conclude that the
unmistakable trend in recent years has been towards judicially self-imposed limits on federal
jurisdiction.
The Court has pursued this project aggressively and notwithstanding the rise of
textualism. This project and textualism are in harmony when Congress purports to oust the
federal courts of jurisdiction or to impose express limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction. But
textualism’s focus on plain statutory text and the project to limit federal jurisdiction are in
serious tension when Congress ostensibly—that is, on the face of its enactments— confers
expansive jurisdiction. The sections that follow demonstrate that although the Court’s textualists
have consistently applied a textualist approach to jurisdiction-ousting statutes, they have not
done so when interpreting statutes that appear to grant jurisdiction without exception.114 As I
explain in Part IV, when faced with this conflict between the desire to be faithful agents and the
desire to limit judicial authority, textualists have often115 sacrificed the former in the name of
advancing the latter.
In this Part, I survey the Court’s treatment of the many jurisdictional statutes that
operationalize Article III’s grant of the judicial power to the federal courts. Because I am
mindful of the perils of critiquing the decisions of a multi-member body, 116 and because it is
important to understand the Justices’ individual approaches, I give as much attention to the
expressed views of the Court’s self-professed textualists as I do to the Court’s actual decisions in
cases in which the two differ. I have limited my discussion to the Court’s decisions since the rise
of textualism, treating Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Court in 1986 as a rough proxy for the
beginning of textualism’s rise in importance. Finally, by focusing on the views of the Court’s
textualists, I do not mean to suggest that the Court’s non-textualist Justices have always
113

Id. at 1421.
In Part IV, I argue that the best explanation for this selective application of textualism is that textualists have
been more committed to textualism’s general project of limiting judicial authority than they have been to
textualism’s insistence that judges act as faithful agents of Congress. In that Part, I also conclude that other
explanations cannot fully account for why the rise of textualism has only selectively resulted in interpretations of
jurisdictional statutes that can fairly be said to be based strictly on textual considerations—and that if they are forced
to bear a heavy burden in explaining the selective application of textualism, then textualists’ claims about faithful
agency are substantially undermined. See infra, Part IV.
115
But not always. See supra, Part III.D.
116
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
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consistently applied their particular chosen approaches to statutory interpretation. I focus on the
textualists because the textualists, unlike the non-textualists, have insisted that only
theirapproach is theoretically coherent and consistent with the faithful-agent conception of the
judicial role.
A. An Illustrative Recent Case: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld117
As an illustrative case, consider the Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which
demonstrates the textualists’ approach selective approach to jurisdictional statutes.

The

threshold question in Hamdan was whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)118
deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s challenge to the system of
military commissions established to adjudicate alleged offenses committed during hostilities in
Afghanistan. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens, relied on “ordinary principles of statutory
construction” in holding that the statute did not deprive it of jurisdiction.119 The Court noted that
not “all jurisdiction-stripping provisions—or even all such provisions that truly lack retroactive
effect—must apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment,” because “normal rules of
construction, including a contextual reading of statutory language, may dictate otherwise.”120
In concluding that the statute did not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction, the Court
relied, among other things, on the statute’s legislative history.121 The Court chided Justice
Scalia, who dissented on jurisdictional grounds, for facilely relying on the statute’s “plain
meaning” when Congress had declined expressly to provide that the relevant subsection of the
statute applied to pending cases, even while making just such express provision for the other
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126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. Section 1005(e)(1) provides: “No court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Sections 1005(e)(2) and (3) vest exclusive jurisdiction in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review certain decisions. Section
1005(h)(1) provides that “[t]his section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,” and 1005(h)(2)
provides that “Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review is
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126 S. Ct. at 2764.
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subsections of the same provision.122 The Court rejected the government’s argument that the
Court should abstain pursuant to the “judge-made rule that civilian courts should await the final
outcome of on-going military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceedings.”123
Relying on the congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction (at least with regard to
abstention) the Court found no reason for federal courts to “depart from their general ‘duty to
exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.’”124
Justice Scalia, the Court’s leading textualist, dissent joined by Justices Thomas and
Alito.125 He asserted that the DTA’s plain text unambiguously deprived the courts of jurisdiction
to consider Hamdan’s habeas petition. According to Justice Scalia, an “ancient and unbroken
line of authority attests that statutes ousting jurisdiction unambiguously apply to cases pending at
their effective date,” and he argued that this “venerable rule” is not a “judge-made ‘presumption
against jurisdiction.’”126 Instead, he argued that it is a simple recognition of the reality that “the
plain import of a statute repealing jurisdiction is to eliminate the power to consider and render
judgment—in an already pending case no less than in a case yet to be filed.”127 “To alter this
plain meaning,” he insisted, “our cases have required an explicit reservation of pending cases in
the jurisdiction-repealing statute.”128

In Justice Scalia’s view, straightforward textualism

required this conclusion: “[T]he cases granting such immediate effect are legion, and they
repeatedly rely on the plain language of the jurisdictional repeal as an “inflexible trump” . . . by
requiring an express reservation to save pending cases.”129
Justice Scalia then criticized the majority for relying on the legislative history of the DTA
“to buttress its implausible reading,” because “[w]e have repeatedly held that such reliance is
impermissible where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous.”130 In criticizing the
Court’s reliance on legislative history, Justice Scalia advanced the classic textualist arguments
for eschewing such reliance: Legislative history was not enacted “through the constitutionally
122
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124
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prescribed method of putting language into a bill that a majority of both Houses vote for and the
President signs”;131 and “[a]s always—but especially in the context of strident, partisan
legislative conflict of the sort that characterized enactment of this legislation—the language of
the statute that was actually passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President is
our only authoritative and only reliable guidepost.”132
If Justice Scalia’s view about the meaning of the DTA evinced quintessential
textualism—and seeming obeisance to the strong congressional-control model for federal
jurisdiction—his fall-back argument suggested quite the opposite. “Even if Congress had not
clearly and constitutionally eliminated jurisdiction over this case,” he argued, “neither this Court
nor the lower courts ought to exercise it.”133 Hamdan asserted jurisdiction under the federal
habeas statute, which provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions.”134 Justice Scalia insisted that “[t]raditionally, equitable principles govern both the
exercise of habeas jurisdiction and the granting of the injunctive relief sought by petitioner,”135
and he argued that, “[i]n light of Congress’s provision of an alternate avenue for petitioner’s
claims . . ., those equitable principles counsel that we abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this
case.”136

Such abstention, Justice Scalia argued, was warranted because of concerns of

“interbranch comity.”137
Justice Scalia’s approach is consistent with a pattern that has emerged since the
ascendancy of textualism: The Court’s self-professed textualists advance strict, textually based
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes that eliminate or limit federal court jurisdiction, to reach
the conclusion that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over matters within the scope of those
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statutes;138 at the same time they remain willing to offer wholly atextual interpretations of
jurisdictional statutes that appear to grant more expansive jurisdiction, to reach the same
conclusion.

The following sections substantiate this pattern.

I consider first the Court’s

treatment of statutes that purport to deprive the courts of jurisdiction, or that purport to confer
jurisdiction over only a limited class of cases. Then, I turn to the Court’s treatment of statutes
that appear to confer expansive jurisdiction on the federal courts.

In each section, I use

illustrative cases to demonstrate the basic approach of the Court’s textualist Justices.

B. Textualist Interpretations of Statutes Limiting Lower Federal-Court Jurisdiction
Justice Scalia’s approach in Hamdan is the rule, not the exception. This is true not only
for the textualists’ approach to construing the federal habeas statute in cases involving detainees
in the war on terror, or habeas cases more generally, but also for other statutes that ostensibly
deprive the lower federal courts of jurisdiction, or at least affirmatively purport to exclude some
cases from those courts’ jurisdiction. I address these categories of cases in turn.
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This trend has been quite pronounced recently. Although the Court decided very few cases involving
jurisdictional issues in the October 2007 term—the most important was Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008),
but the question whether Congress had stripped the courts of jurisdiction was quite straightforward, and no member
of the Court disagreed with the majority’s resolution of that question, id. at 2242–44—in the October 2006 term, the
Court decided seven cases that involved claims that a lower federal court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. In five of
the cases, the Court held that the lower federal court lacked jurisdiction, generally relying on the plain meaning of an
ostensibly jurisdiction-limiting provision of the relevant jurisdictional statute. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United
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(2007) (holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over appeal when district court extended time to appeal by
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See Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2421 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.); Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1086
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.); Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1412 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg,
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the Court’s textualists dissented. See Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007) (holding that a district court’s order
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In Rasul v. Bush,139 the Court held that the federal habeas statute conferred jurisdiction to
hear challenges by aliens held at Guantanamo Bay.140 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented. The dissent relied upon the proposition that “[f]ederal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and that it “is to be presumed that a cause lies outside
this limited jurisdiction.”141 He chastised the Court for ignoring the “words of [28 U.S.C.] §
2241,” the habeas statute, which “presupposes a federal district court with territorial jurisdiction
over the detainee.”142
Scalia also argued that “Congress is in session,” and that “[i]f it wished to change federal
judges’ habeas jurisdiction from what this Court had previously held that to be, it could have
done so.”143 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Court’s other textualists, followed this
approach in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,144 in which he held for the Court that the district court in which
the respondent filed his habeas petition lacked jurisdiction over the custodian because it was not
the district of confinement. The Court relied on the “plain language of the habeas statute,”145 and
argued that “it is surely just as necessary in important cases as in unimportant ones that courts
take care not to exceed their ‘respective jurisdictions’ established by Congress.”146
The textualists’ approach in Hamdan, Rasul, and Padilla cannot be explained simply by
reference to the unusual status of the habeas petitioners in those cases. Instead, the textualists’
approach in those cases is consistent with their general approach to congressional limitations on
the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction, which I will discuss in detail below.147 First,
139
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however, a very brief history is in order. In 1867, Congress granted the lower federal courts
jurisdiction to review the claims of persons restrained under state law in violation of federal
law.148 Until the 1950s, the Court construed the statute to permit review only of the question
whether the committing court had jurisdiction over the petitioner.149 In the 1950s, however, the
Court began to construe the statutory grant of jurisdiction expansively (and largely atextually).150
Later, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts limited the reach of those decisions and erected other
hurdles in the way of habeas petitioners. However, just like the Warren Court decisions to which
these later Courts reacted, such developments almost always occurred through a common-law
process with little basis in the text of the statute or demonstrable congressional intent.151
In 1996, Congress revised the statutory habeas regime when it enacted the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),152 which imposed limits—some
incorporating existing judicial precedent, and others created by Congress—on the federal courts’
authority to entertain and grant habeas petitions.153 Unlike the Court’s pre-AEDPA decisions,
which often made little effort to ground habeas doctrine in the language of the habeas statute,
recent decisions construing AEDPA, particularly and perhaps unsurprisingly in opinions by the
Court’s textualists, have relied more heavily on statutory language.154 In Tyler v. Cain,155 for
example, Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, narrowly interpreted 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(A), which creates an exception to AEDPA’s limitations on habeas jurisdiction for
new constitutional rules that the Supreme Court has “made retroactive to cases on collateral
review.”156 Justice Thomas insisted that the word “made” is synonymous with “held,” and that

incarceration is not one of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.”)). But the Court has long held that the federal courts
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the textual standard is not satisfied by the Court’s merely establishing principles of retroactivity
to be applied by the lower courts.157 Justice Breyer’s dissent, in contrast, invoked the statute’s
purpose, which, he argued, did not “favor[], let alone require[], the majority’s conclusion.”158
Similarly, in Williams v. Taylor,159 the textualist-leaning Justices relied on dictionary definitions
to justify a more narrow interpretation than that advanced by the dissenters of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), which limits the grounds upon which habeas may be granted.160
161

Florida,

In Lawrence v.

the textualist-leaning Justices relied on what “the text of the statute,” “[r]ead

naturally,” “must mean”162 in concluding that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for
seeking federal habeas relief from a state-court judgment163 was not tolled during the pendency
of a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the denial of
state post-conviction relief.164 In construing AEDPA in this fashion, the Court’s textualistleaning Justices have made explicit their view that Congress controls the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, at least with respect to jurisdiction-ousting statutes.165
The Court’s textualists have not always prevailed in cases interpreting AEDPA, but when
in dissent they—particularly Justices Scalia and Thomas—have consistently advanced
arguments, based on statutory text, that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief. In Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal,166 for example, the Court held that a prisoner’s competency-to-be-executed
claim, which had been presented in a habeas application but had not been resolved because it
157
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was not yet ripe, did not render a subsequent habeas application raising that claim a “second or
successive application” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.167 Justices Scalia and Thomas
each dissented. Justice Scalia relied on the “unmistakable language” of the statute to conclude
that Congress had deprived the courts of the jurisdiction that they had exercised before the
enactment of AEDPA.168 Justice Thomas “beg[an] with the plain language of the statute,”169
relied on dictionary definitions of statutory terms,170 and scolded the Court for letting its view of
what would be perverse “override the statute’s plain meaning.”171 In his dissent in Hohn v.
United States,172 Justice Scalia (joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas) advanced a similar
argument. Their opinions in these cases rely quite explicitly on strong congressional-control
models of federal jurisdiction.173
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr,174 the Court held that AEDPA and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)175 did not
deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to review an alien’s habeas petition.176 The majority
relied heavily on canons of construction—including the doctrine of constitutional doubt—which
it deployed to require clear statements of congressional intent before effectively suspending the
writ of habeas corpus.177 In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, and Justice O’Connor in part) criticized the Court for finding “ambiguity in the utterly
clear language of a statute that forbids the district court (and all other courts) to entertain the
167
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claims of aliens . . . found deportable by reason of their criminal acts.”178 He complained that
“[i]t has happened before—too frequently, alas—that courts have distorted plain statutory text in
order to produce a ‘more sensible’ result,” and he charged that the Court’s opinion did “violence
. . . to the statutory text.”179

Finally, he belittled the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of

constitutional doubt by arguing that it is “a device for interpreting what the statute says—not for
ignoring what the statute says in order to avoid the trouble of determining whether what it says is
unconstitutional.”180 To Justice Scalia, the statute was “crystal clear,”181 and that was largely the
end of the matter.182
Yet another example of the textualists’ consistency in their approach to jurisdictionousting statutes is Lindh v. Murphy.183 The Court held that certain provisions of AEDPA did not
apply to non-capital cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment.184 Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) dissented. He acknowledged that
the Court had previously, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,185 “rejected a
presumption favoring retroactivity for jurisdiction-creating statutes,” but argued that nothing in
prior cases “disparaged our longstanding practice of applying jurisdiction-ousting statutes to
pending cases.”186 In other words, the Court’s textualist Justices—all of whom had joined the
opinion in Hughes—self-consciously applied different default rules to jurisdiction-creating and
jurisdiction-ousting statutes, maximizing the chances that the Court would decline to exercise
jurisdiction in any given case.
To be sure, the textualist Justices did join the opinion in Felker v. Turpin,187 which
avoided resolving any Suspension or Exceptions Clause issues by noting that Congress had not
purported in AEDPA to strip the Supreme Court of its “original” jurisdiction to grant habeas
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petitions.188 But the Court has rarely exercised that jurisdiction. More important for present
purposes, Felker itself upheld a statute that substantially narrowed federal court jurisdiction in
habeas cases, and in this respect the decision is consistent with the textualist Justices’ more
general pattern of construing strictly only those jurisdictional statutes that limit, rather than
expand, federal court jurisdiction.189
Of course, it is possible that the textualists’ approach to AEDPA reflects judicial hostility
to habeas claims by persons convicted of crimes, or perhaps sympathy for claims of judicial
federalism, more than it demonstrates anything particular about federal-court jurisdiction in
general.190 Any such argument is at best incomplete, however, because the textualists’ approach
to AEDPA is consistent with their approach to other statutes that purport to limit the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
There are a litany of examples.

In Woodford v. Ngo,191 for example, the Court’s

textualists interpreted the exhaustion provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act192 to preclude
suits in which the prisoner filed an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective state
administrative grievance or appeal.193

In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Committee,194 the Court held that the IIRIRA deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over a
suit raising a selective-enforcement claim against INS. Justice Scalia’s majority, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor, advanced a “narrow reading”
of the relevant provision of the statute,195 and chastised Justice Souter’s contrary reading for
departing from the plain import of the statute’s language.196
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The pattern does not simply for statutes limiting jurisdiction over claims by disfavored
litigants. The textualists also dissented, in Hibbs v. Winn,197 from the Court’s conclusion that the
Tax Injunction Act198 does not bar an action raising an Establishment Clause challenge to a
state’s tax program for allocating revenue to private schools. In reaching that conclusion, the
majority relied in part on legislative history and statutory purpose.199 Justice Kennedy (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) argued, in dissent, that the Court’s
interpretation of the statute “contrasts with a literal reading of its terms,” and that “[i]n the end
the scope and purpose of the Act should be understood from its terms alone.”200 Kennedy relied
on dictionary definitions of statutory terms, and criticized the Court’s reliance on the statute’s
legislative history and purposes, at least with respect to a statute that contains “a plain
congressional declaration” on the matter in question.201 Justice Kennedy also expressly invoked
the congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction in support of his view.202 Similarly,
Justice Scalia dissented in Webster v. Doe.203 There, the Court held that a discharged CIA
employee’s constitutional claims were judicially reviewable notwithstanding a provision of the
National Security Act of 1947204 that, when viewed in light of the Administrative Procedure
Act,205 arguably divested the federal courts of the power to review such termination decisions.
Justice Scalia relied on what he viewed as the straightforward reading of the relevant statutory
provisions,206 and made clear that he accepts the congressional-control model of federal
jurisdiction, at least with respect to jurisdiction-stripping statutes.207
The textualists have advanced this view of statutes authorizing jurisdiction over limited
classes of more mundane claims, as well. In Finley v. United States,208 Justice Scalia wrote for a
197
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bare majority, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)209 did not permit exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction over claims against parties as to which no independent basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction existed.210 Justice Scalia began by noting the “rudimentary
law” that in order for there to be federal jurisdiction, “an act of Congress must have supplied
it.”211 He then acknowledged that the Court had not always carefully adhered to this rule in
cases involving pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,212 but he stated that “with respect to the
addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume that the full
constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes
broadly.”213 Reading the text of the FTCA narrowly, Justice Scalia noted that § 1346(b) was not
“formulat[ed as] one might expect if the presence of a claim against the United States constituted
merely a minimum jurisdictional requirement, rather than a definition of the permissible scope of
FTCA actions.”214 The Court accordingly concluded that “‘against the United States’ means
against the United States and no one else,” and that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claims against parties other than the United States.215
Likewise, the Court’s textualists have taken the Court to task for failing to observe the
limits that they have found in the plain terms of the removal statute. In Murphy Bros., Inc. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,216 the Court held that a defendant must be officially summoned to
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appear in an action before the time to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) begins to run.217 The
Court relied in part on the legislative history of the statute and its revisions in reaching its
conclusion and in rejecting the court of appeals’ reliance on the “plain meaning” of the statute.218
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) urged reliance on the
“plain language” of section 1446(b), chastising the Court for “superimpos[ing] a judicially
created service of process requirement onto § 1446(b).”219 The dissenters argued that the Court’s
approach departed “from this Court’s practice of strictly construing removal and similar
jurisdictional statutes,”220 an approach that would have limited the ability of litigants to invoke
federal jurisdiction via removal.
Justice Scalia offered a similar view, this time for the Court, in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Serv., Inc.221 There, he concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s prohibition on appellate
review of subject-matter-jurisdiction-based remands222 does not require an absence of
jurisdiction at the time of removal. He reached this conclusion based on the “standard principle
of statutory construction [that] provides that identical words and phrases within the same statute
should normally be given the same meaning,”223 and he rejected the petitioner’s contention
because it had “no textual support.”224 Justice Scalia made clear that textualist principles of
statutory interpretation drove the decision: “We will not ignore a clear jurisdictional statute in
reliance upon supposition of what Congress really wanted,” because “[a]s far as the Third
Branch is concerned, what the text of § 1447(d) indisputably does prevails over what it ought to
have done.”225
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Finally, the textualists have generally refused to find federal jurisdiction without an
explicit grant of statutory authority: In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,226 the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the district court lacked inherent power to
enforce the terms of a settlement agreement under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, where
the agreement was not part of the order of dismissal and there was no independent basis for
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.227 Justice Scalia explained that “[f]ederal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction,” and that “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Accordingly, it “is to be presumed that
a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”228 The textualists have also advanced this position by
granting a motion to dismiss a dispensable non-diverse party,229 and by regularly joining
opinions expressing reluctance to find appellate jurisdiction under the judicially created
collateral-order doctrine.230
Textualists, in other words, have consistently relied on the plain meaning of jurisdictionousting or jurisdiction–limiting statutes to find that the federal courts have been deprived of
jurisdiction. In offering such interpretations of jurisdictional statutes, the Court’s textualists have
often relied explicitly on a strong congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction, insisting
that the federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction that Congress has withheld.

C. Textualists’ Non-Textualist Approaches to Statutes Ostensibly Conferring Broad Jurisdiction
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But the textualists on the Court have not always advanced the congressional-control
model of federal jurisdiction. In cases interpreting statutes that, by their plain terms, seem to
confer expansive jurisdiction, the textualists have often read the statutes atextually to find that
the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction.
Recall Justice Scalia’s willingness in Hamdan to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
the petitioner’s habeas claims, even if Congress had not withheld such jurisdiction in enacting
the DTA.

In that case, he urged abstention out of a concern for “interbranch comity.”231

Interbranch comity has led the Court, and at least some of its textualists, to consider or urge
abstention in other contexts, as well. In Republic of Austria v. Altmann,232 the Court held that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies to conduct that occurred prior to its enactment, thus
authorizing jurisdiction over a suit that would have been barred if filed at the time that the
challenged conduct occurred.233
The Courts’ textualists divided in their views of the jurisdictional question. Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the
statute should be read against the presumption against retroactivity.234 In concluding that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction, they thus did not rely solely on the statute’s plain language,
instead insisting on a clear statement from Congress of retroactive effect.235 In contrast, Justice
Scalia both joined the Court’s opinion and filed a separate concurring opinion. As is discussed
below, his separate opinion could be characterized as advancing the strong congressional-control
model of federal court jurisdiction, in a case in which Congress apparently expanded rather than
limited lower-federal-court jurisdiction.236

But Justice Scalia also joined Justice Stevens’s

opinion for the court, which announced the Court’s willingness to “decline to exercise
jurisdiction in particular cases implicating foreign sovereign immunity” in response to Executive
Branch statements of interest. Such statements “might well be entitled to deference as the
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considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy,” and thus might
warrant abstention.237
Although Hamdan and Altmann involved claims for abstention in the name of interbranch
comity, the Court’s textualists have also urged or required the lower federal courts to decline to
exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has conferred in cases that do not involve weighty
questions of the separation of powers. Several decisions demonstrate the Court’s textualists’
refusing to assert apparently available jurisdiction based on atextual considerations. In Penzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,238 for example, the Court held that the district court should have abstained,
under the doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris,239 from hearing the plaintiff’s federal claims,
which the judgment debtor had not presented to the Texas courts, because it was possible that the
claims would be mooted by resolution of the state-court proceeding.240 Justice Scalia joined the
opinion, even though, as he stated in his separate concurrence, he saw “no jurisdictional bar to
the Court’s decision in this case.”241 The Court’s textualists also joined the Court’s opinion in
Tenet v. Doe,242 which required the dismissal of a suit by an alleged former spy seeking to
enforce an espionage agreement, under the doctrine of Totten v. United States,243 which
“precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents’ where success depends upon the
existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government.”244 The Court made clear
that the Totten doctrine was effectively jurisdictional,245 and Justice Scalia concurred to make
clear his view that, contrary to Justice Stevens’s assertion in his own concurring opinion,246 “as
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applied today, the bar of Totten is a jurisdictional one.”247

Justice Scalia thus expressly

acknowledged and agreed to apply an implicit, judge-made jurisdictional bar to prevent the
assertion of jurisdiction, which was presumably otherwise available under the general federalquestion statute.248
Indeed, although the language of the federal-question statute is almost identical to that in
Article III,249 the Court has long treated the statute as conferring less than the full extent of
jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution.250

The textualists have, for the most part, not

questioned this fundamentally atextual approach to the federal-question statute.251 In Rivet v.
Regents Bank of Louisiana,252 for example, the textualist Justices joined the Court’s opinion
applying the well-pleaded complaint rule in a federal question suit, even though the Court made
clear long ago that the well-pleaded complaint rule is not required by the language of Article
III.253 And in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,254 Justice Scalia, writing
247

Id. at 12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court did not address the government’s contention that the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), required the respondents to file their claims in the Court of Federal Claims, rather than the
district court. See 544 U.S. at 6 n.4.
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Compare Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), with Louisville and N.R. Co. v.
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is willing to consider an interpretation of section 1331 that narrows, albeit perhaps not dramatically, see id. at 321,
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for the Court, read 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which confers original jurisdiction on “civil actions arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents,” implicitly to incorporate the well-pleaded
complaint rule, as well.255
The textualists have not limited their atextual approach the general federal-question
statute. Justice Scalia also offered a narrow interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which
ostensibly is a broad jurisdictional grant, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.256 In Sosa, the Court held
that the Alien Tort Statute, which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts over suits by aliens
for torts committed in violation of the law of nations, authorizes courts to hear claims “in a very
limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”257 The majority
read the statute to authorize a narrow class of claims based on current international norms, as
long as they do not have “less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”258
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued in his
separate opinion that the ATS does not confer discretion on the federal courts to create causes of
action for the enforcement of international-law-based norms.259 Justice Scalia did not deny that
the ATS confers jurisdiction, but he argued that it should not be read to authorize federal
common-law making by courts in the post-Erie era: “In holding open the possibility that judges
may create rights where Congress has not authorized them to do so, the Court countenances
judicial occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s representatives,” hardly a “recipe for
restraint in the future.”260 Although Justice Scalia’s argument thus focused on the nature of the
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The decision in Holmes Group, to be sure, was largely driven by precedent, but Justice Scalia also argued that
the conclusion was based on “what the words of the statute must fairly be understood to mean.” Id. at 833. He
argued that the phrase arising under is “familiar to all law students as invoking the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Id.
at 833. This reading deprived the Federal Circuit of appellate jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action that
included a counterclaim arising under the patent laws, although it would not have deprived a different federal court
of appeals of jurisdiction. See id. at 840 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The sole question presented
here concerns Congress’ allocation of adjudicatory authority among the federal courts of appeals.”).
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542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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Id. at 713; see id. at 725.
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Id. at 732. As in Altmann, the Court also suggested the possibility of abstention in a case involving a claim
under the ATS. See id. at 733 n.21 (“Another possibility that we need not apply here is a policy of case-specific
deference to the political branches. . . . In such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should give
serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.”). His opinion thus might
have been driven by concerns of interbranch comity, but its approach to federal court jurisdiction is consistent with
his approach in cases that do not involve such concerns.
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claims, if any, that can be asserted in a suit filed under the ATS’s jurisdictional grant, rather than
on the scope of the jurisdictional grant itself, his view would essentially have rendered
meaningless the jurisdictional grant in the statute.
The Court’s textualists have similarly not shied away from narrowly reading the grant of
jurisdiction in the diversity statute.261 In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,262 the Court held, in an
opinion by Justice Scalia, that the citizenship of limited partners had to be taken into account to
determine diversity of citizenship in a case in which one of the parties was a limited
partnership.263

Justice Scalia relied principally on precedent264 and Congress’s likely

understanding of the statutory terms in light of precedent.265 But he also insisted that the
question whether any given “artificial entity” should be considered a “citizen” for diversity
purposes, and “which of their members’ citizenship is to be consulted, are questions more readily
resolved by legislative prescription than by legal reasoning.”266 The Court thus concluded that it
would “leave” such decisions “to Congress.”267
But to insist that the task of defining the citizenship of a particular party should fall to
Congress simply begs the question whether Congress effectively had done so already, in enacting
section 1332. There is no doubt that congressional elaboration of the term “citizen” would be
helpful, but it is hardly unusual for the Court to give meaning to generalized statutory terms.
The Court in Carden most assuredly did construe the term “citizen,” to embrace all of the
individuals who constitute a partnership. But this interpretation, when viewed with Justice
Scalia’s suggestion, in other contexts, about the legislative role, effectively means that in cases
of statutory ambiguity, the Court should construe jurisdictional statutes in a way that defeats,
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rather than confers, jurisdiction.268 Such a canon might be defensible, but, as explained in Part
IV, it is in serious tension with textualist claims about faithful agency and legislative
supremacy.269
Indeed, the Court’s textualists have not hesitated to join opinions that have recognized
judicially created, atextual exceptions to the grant of jurisdiction in the diversity statute. In
Ankenbrandt v. Richards,270 the Court held that there is an implicit domestic-relations exception
to the jurisdiction conferred by the diversity statute,271 which encompasses only cases involving
the issuance of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.272

The Court reached this

conclusion even after acknowledging that Article III “does not mandate the exclusion of
domestic relations cases from federal-court jurisdiction.”273

Moreover, the Court also

acknowledged that Congress had amended the diversity statute in 1948, well after the Court had
first suggested the existence of an implicit domestic relations exception to the diversity
jurisdiction,274 to bring within the diversity jurisdiction a seemingly broader class of cases.275
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, among others, joined Justice White’s opinion for the Court.
To be sure, the Court in Ankenbrandt offered a relatively narrow scope for the domesticrelations exception. But other members of the Court urged an even more restrained approach. In
his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun was “unable to agree . . . that the
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In any event, Justice Scalia and the Court’s textualists has been willing to join opinions interpreting the terms
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nature at common law or in equity” to “all civil actions”).
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diversity statute contains any ‘exception’ for domestic relations matters.”276 In reaching that
conclusion, he relied on the language of the then-current diversity statute, arguing that a “change
in language that, if anything, expands the jurisdictional scope of a statute” is meager evidence
“of approval of a prior narrow construction,” particularly a prior construction that was, at best,
only implicit in the Court’s prior decisions.277
It is perhaps telling that Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion in Ankenbrandt. Justice
White, writing for the Court, argued that “[w]hen Congress amended the diversity statute in 1948
to replace the law/equity distinction”—which had been part of the basis for the Court’s original
suggestion of a domestic-relations exception278—“with the phrase ‘all civil actions,’ we presume
Congress did so with full cognizance of the Court's nearly century-long interpretation of the prior
statutes, which had construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for
certain domestic relations matters.”279 Yet six years after joining Justice White’s opinion, Justice
Scalia, in dissent in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,280 which interpreted AEDPA’s modifications
to the habeas regime, criticized the Court for “flout[ing] the unmistakable language of the statute
to avoid what it calls a ‘perverse’ result,” when the only thing perverse “about the result that the
statute commands . . . [is] that it contradicts pre-existing judge-made law, which it was precisely
the purpose of the statute to change.”281 There is nothing inherently wrong, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, with such an argument, but it would seem to apply with equal force to
the diversity statute. The “pre-existing judge-made law” in the context of the diversity statute,
however, unlike the pre-AEDPA body of law, deprived rather than expanded federal-court
jurisdiction.

In each case, Justice Scalia chose the construction that limited federal-court

jurisdiction.
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A unanimous Court similarly concluded, in Marshall v. Marshall,282 that the probate
exception to federal jurisdiction does not apply to deprive a bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over
a claim that a third party tortiously interfered with a widow’s expectancy of inheritance from her
deceased husband.

The Court noted that the exception is a “judicially created doctrine[]

stemming in large measure from misty understandings of English legal history,”283 and made
clear its desire to curtail “sweeping extension[s]” of the exception.284
285

the Court, whose opinion all of the Court’s textualists joined,

But as in Ankenbrandt,
did not abandon the

exception,286 even though Justice Stevens urged the Court to do.287
It is possible, of course, that the limitations that have been imposed by the Court or
proposed by individual Justices on the diversity jurisdiction reflect a frequently noted judicial
hostility to that particular grant of jurisdiction.288

But the Court’s consistently stingy

interpretation of the diversity statute is in fact consistent with the larger pattern identifiable in its
treatment of other statutory grants of jurisdiction.

And the judicial willingness to decline to

exercise jurisdiction that Congress seems to have granted—whether expressed as a form of
abstention doctrine, as in Penzoil, as a limitation implicit in the statute’s terms, as in Carden, or
as a judicially created exception to the statute’s grant of jurisdiction, as in Ankenbrandt and
Marshall—is in considerable tension with the congressional-control model of federal
jurisdiction. Indeed, Martin Redish, an avid proponent of the strong congressional-control model
both for jurisdiction-ousting and jurisdiction-conferring statutes, has compared the diversity
exceptions to other partial abstention doctrines289 and argued that both are equally
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constitutionally problematic as a matter of the separation of powers.290 More important for
present purposes, the textualists’ willingness to abstain or to read statutory grants of jurisdiction
to include implicit exceptions suggests a very different view of Congress’s authority to control
the federal jurisdictional regime than do the cases described in the prior section, in which the
textualists regularly insisted that it impermissibly ignores Congress’s authority to exercise
jurisdiction that Congress did not explicitly confer upon the federal courts.

D. Counter-Trends: Textualist Approaches to Statutes Ostensibly Conferring Broad Jurisdiction
All of this is not to suggest that the Court’s textualists always depart from textualist
approaches to the broad statutory grants of jurisdiction. In most cases in which jurisdiction is
premised on those statutes, after all, there is no colorable contention that the Court does not have,
or ought not to exercise, jurisdiction. But the Court tends to address only difficult cases, or at
least those cases in which there is more than one colorable argument.291 In those cases, as
illustrated above, the Court’s textualists have departed from plain statutory text to find that the
federal courts lack jurisdiction with surprising frequency.
Yet even among the difficult cases in which there are colorable arguments both for and
against federal jurisdiction, there are some notable exceptions to the pattern described above. As
a preliminary matter, it is possible to view the position of the Court’s textualists in Ankenbrandt
and Marshall, and Justice Scalia’s position in Altmann, as evidence of a willingness to read even
expansive statutory grants of jurisdiction according to their plain terms. In Ankenbrandt and
Marshall, after all, the textualists joined opinions that arguably narrowed judicially crafted,
atextual exceptions—the domestic-relations and probate exceptions, respectively—to federalcourt jurisdiction.292 But as noted above, some members of the Court in those cases urged
290
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wholesale rejection of the exceptions, which the Court, and its textualists, declined to do.293 In
Altmann, Justice Scalia argued in his separate opinion that the Court had not properly taken
account of the “consistent practice of giving immediate effect to statutes that alter a court’s
jurisdiction,”294 a practice that, in that case, required the conclusion that the Court had
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims. In this respect, Justice Scalia appeared to endorse the
strong congressional-control model of federal jurisdiction both for statutes conferring and
ousting jurisdiction.295 But the bulk of Justice Scalia’s argument appeared directed toward
demonstrating that jurisdiction-ousting statutes should be applied to pending cases,296 a matter
over which Justice Scalia had previously sparred with his non-textualist colleagues.297
Ultimately, though, Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion, which also held open the
possibility that the Court would abstain in cases implicating foreign sovereign immunity.298
Meanwhile, the Court’s other textualists were in dissent, arguing that the Court should not have
found jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims.299 Ankenbrandt, Marshall, and Altmann thus are
not powerful counter-examples of the pattern described above.
293

In addition, the Court’s willingness in Marshall to reject a probate exception to federal jurisdiction might be
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jurisdiction premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the statute vesting federal courts with jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases
and related proceedings. Whereas the probate exception frequently has been invoked by the courts of appeals (and
occasionally by the Supreme Court) in cases premised on diversity of citizenship, see, e.g., Sutton v. English, 246
U.S. 199, 205-07 (1918); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 45 (1909); Turja v. Turja,
118 F.3d 1006, 1009-10 (4th Cir. 1997); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1978), to which the Court has long seemed hostile, see, e.g., Friedman, A
Different Dialogue, supra note 5, at 27-28; Freer, The Cauldron Boils, supra note 288, at 60, bankruptcy has a long
pedigree as a quintessentially federal basis for jurisdiction, cf. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. And as the Court noted,
the “broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by § 1334(b) is subject to a mandatory abstention provision applicable to
certain state-law claims” that did not embrace the claims at issue in Marshall, and that is, “in turn, qualified.”
Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1746 n.3.
294
541 U.S. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring).
295
Id. at 292–03 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our jurisdiction cases are explained, I think, by the fact that the purpose
of provisions conferring or eliminating jurisdiction is to permit or forbid the exercise of judicial power—so that the
relevant event for retroactivity purposes is the moment at which that power is sought to be exercised.”).
296
Id. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring) (critiquing the Court’s view of retroactivity by noting that new jurisdictional
rules do not always ‘take[] away no substantive right but simply change[] the tribunal that is to hear the case,’”
because a “jurisdictional rule can deny a litigant a forum for his claim entirely . . . or may leave him with an
alternate forum that will deny relief for some collateral reason ( e.g., a statute of limitations bar)”); id. at 292-93
(supporting view by arguing that “applying a jurisdiction-eliminating statute to undo past judicial action would be
applying it retroactively; but applying it to prevent any judicial action after the statute takes effect is applying it
prospectively.”).
297
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
298
See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 701-02; supra notes 232– 237 and accompanying text.
299
See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 715-20 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas).

48

Other cases, however, suggest more willingness on the part of the Court’s textualists to
read statutes ostensibly conferring expansive jurisdiction according to their plain language. In
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc.,300 a divided Court held that a federal court sitting in
diversity may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over additional
plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement,
provided that the claims are part of the same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who
do allege a sufficient amount in controversy.301 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in an
opinion that Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, stated that “[w]e must not give jurisdictional
statutes a more expansive interpretation than their text warrants.” But he also insisted that “it is
just as important not to adopt an artificial construction that is narrower than what the text
provides,” because “[n]o sound canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak with
extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal jurisdiction within appropriate
constitutional bounds.”302 The Court thus relied on section 1367’s “text in light of context,
structure, and related statutory provisions,”303 and found the statute to be a “broad jurisdictional
grant, with no distinction between pendent-claim and pendent-party cases.”304 The Court also
declined to treat arguably contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history as authoritative
evidence of congressional intent, offering the familiar textualist critique of reliance on legislative
history.305
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Allapattah is a puzzling decision. Although the majority argued that the statute was
“unambiguous,”306 and read literally section 1367(b)’s exceptions to the jurisdiction conferred in
section 1367(a),307 it is difficult to characterize the Court’s interpretation of section 1367(a) as
obviously textualist. To reach its conclusion, the majority was forced to read section 1367(a)’s
phrase “civil action” to mean “claim.”308 To be sure, this reading was eminently defensible, but
the reasons why it is defensible are largely independent of the plain text of the provision.309
Even if the Court’s approach in Allapattah was not purely textualist, the fact remains that the
Court’s textualists voted in favor of a more expansive interpretation of a federal jurisdictional
statute than some of their non-textualist colleagues were prepared to accept.310 One possible
explanation is that there were instrumental justifications for the competing views of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute: The Court’s substantive conservatives supplied an expanded
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avenue for defendants in class actions to remove to federal court,311 where the prospect of
windfall judgments has diminished in recent years,312 and the Court’s liberals resisted this effort.
Allapattah is not the only case in which the Court’s textualists read section 1367 to
confer expansive federal jurisdiction. In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,313
the Court (including all of its textualists) held that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permitted removal of
constitutional claims challenging state designation of landmark status.314 In addition, the Court
held that section 1367 authorized federal court jurisdiction over related state-law claims, even
though the state-law claims called for deferential on-the-record review of state administrative
findings.315 Justice O’Connor relied on the text of section 1367, finding no exception for “claims
that require on-the-record review of a state or local administrative determination” and noting that
“the statute generally confers supplemental jurisdiction over ‘all other claims’ in the same case
or controversy as a federal question, without reference to the nature of review.”316 But even this
reliance on the statute’s plain text was qualified; the Court noted that “there may be situations in
which a district court should abstain from reviewing local administrative determinations even if
the jurisdictional prerequisites are otherwise satisfied.”317 Accordingly, although the Court’s
textualists followed the plain meaning of a broad grant of jurisdiction, they reserved the
prerogative to limit jurisdiction through abstention.
But the Court’s textualists have not always upheld plausible claims for abstention in
cases premised on the ostensibly expansive grant of jurisdiction in the general federal-question
statute. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,318 (NOPSI) for
example, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court declining to extend the
Younger319 and Burford320 abstention doctrines to a case challenging completed legislative
311
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action.321 He emphasized that “cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack
the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.”322 Justice
Scalia went so far as to declare that underlying that proposition “is the undisputed constitutional
principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the
constitutionally permissible bounds.”323 Similarly, in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,324 the
Court (in an opinion by Justice O’Connor) limited abstention doctrine by concluding that
“federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only
where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary,” and thus held that the
district court’s remand order in a damages action was “an unwarranted application of the Burford
doctrine.”325 Justice Kennedy concurred, stating that “[w]e need not rule out . . . the possibility
that a federal court might dismiss a suit for damages in a case where a serious affront to the
interests of federalism could be averted in no other way.”326 This prompted Justice Scalia to
concur separately to make clear his belief that such discretionary dismissals are not available. As
he did in NOPSI, Justice Scalia urged application of the strong congressional-control model,
arguing that “[t]here is no ‘serious affront to the interests of federalism’ when Congress lawfully
decides to pre-empt state action—which is what our cases hold (and today’s opinion affirms)
Congress does whenever it instructs federal courts to assert jurisdiction over matters as to which
relief is not discretionary.”327

Justice Scalia did not, however, question the propriety of

abstention doctrine more generally, at least in cases in which the interest in judicial federalism
was more pronounced.
The cases discussed in this section make clear that the Court’s textualists have not always
upheld claims for abstention from exercising otherwise broad statutory grants of jurisdiction.
Indeed the textualists are clearly of two minds in such cases, perhaps torn (as I discuss in detail
321
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in the section that follows) between the competing mandates of faithful agent theory and judicial
minimalism.

Fittingly, the cases discussed here all involved the abstention side of the

congressional-control question—that is, jurisdictional grants that, by their plain terms, appear to
confer expansive jurisdiction. It is telling that there have been almost no cases in which the
Court’s textualists have read a statute ostensibly ousting the federal courts of jurisdiction to do
less than its plain terms suggest.

IV. TEXTUALISM AND JURISDICTION
The discussion in Part III demonstrated that although the Court’s textualist-leaning
Justices have consistently applied a textualist approach to jurisdiction-ousting statutes, they have
not been as consistent in interpreting statutes that appear to grant jurisdiction without exception.
In this Part, I consider explanations for the selective approach of the Court’s textualists to
jurisdictional statutes. I then turn to what the approach of the Court’s textualists to jurisdictional
statutes reveals both about textualism and, more broadly, about the debate over the appropriate
roles of Congress and the federal courts in crafting a jurisdictional regime.

A. Explanations for the Selective Application of Textualism to Jurisdictional Statutes
1. Fidelity v. Judicial Constraint
Textualists contend that courts should be faithful agents of the legislature, and,
accordingly, that courts should implement only those instructions that appear in the plain text of
legislative enactments. As John Manning has argued, this conviction leads them to “subscribe to
the general principle that texts should be taken at face value—with no implied extensions of
specific texts or exceptions to general ones—even if the legislation will then have an awkward
relationship to the apparent background intention or purpose that produced it.”328

Faithful

agency, in other words, requires strict adherence to the statutory text.
Textualism also proceeds from the assumption that the exercise of judicial power, unless
properly cabined, tends towards impermissible judicial lawmaking, in tension with constitutional
328
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structure and basic democratic theory.329 As noted in Part II, textualists have argued that limiting
judges to the consideration of text in statutory construction more effectively constrains judicial
discretion than other approaches to statutory interpretation, and thus more effectively serves
democratic objectives. Textualists often argue that it is not only important to constrain judges
from doing mischief in cases that are properly before them, but also that, as a general matter, it is
desirable in a democracy to limit the range of cases in which judges have authority to act at all.
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, for example, Justice Scalia lamented that the Court “seems
incapable of admitting that some matters—any matters—are none of its business.”330 The most
prominent textualists regularly have expressed concern about preserving “the proper—and
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”331
When Congress enacts a statute purporting to oust the courts of jurisdiction, the textualist
judge who implements Congress’s plain statutory instructions limits, by definition, the authority
of the judiciary. In such cases, the textualist judge can simultaneously fulfill textualism’s
mandate that the judge act as a faithful agent of Congress, based on enacted statutory text, and
textualism’s urge to constrain both judicial discretion and judicial authority. Accordingly, it is
not surprising to find, as demonstrated above, that the Court’s textualists have regularly relied
strictly on statutory text in construing jurisdiction-ousting statutes.332
Matters are more complicated for the textualist judge when Congress enacts a statute with
plain text purporting to confer expansive jurisdiction on the courts. A methodologically faithful
textualist judge presumably would construe it according to its plain terms, declining to create
implicit exceptions to the statutory grant of authority. After all, textualism’s “general principle
that texts should be taken at face value—with no implied extensions of specific texts or
exceptions to general ones”333 seems quite specifically to enjoin the textualist judge from finding
implicit limitations in broad statutory conferrals of jurisdiction. Such an approach both ensures
faithful agency and advances the general textualist preference to construe congressional
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decisions to create rule-like directives.334 As demonstrated above, however, when called upon to
construe broad jurisdictional grants, the textualist’s desire to be a faithful agent conflicts with the
more generalized impulse to limit judicial authority. Faithful application of broad, jurisdictioncreating statutes, after all, results in a broader range of cases in which judges can exercise
authority, notwithstanding what textualists like to describe as the “properly limited” role of the
judiciary in our democratic system.

Textualists have struggled with jurisdiction-conferring

statutes because such statutes reveal a fundamental tension in the theoretical underpinnings of
their methodology. The discussion above demonstrates that textualists have often resolved this
tension by sacrificing their faithful agency to Congress’s plain instructions, in the name of
restricting judicial authority.
Of course, in interpreting jurisdiction-conferring statutes implicitly to limit judicial
authority, textualists arguably condone the sort of judicial lawmaking that reliance on plain text
is supposed to constrain.

After all, as Justice Scalia has warned, judges freed from the

constraining effect of text might be tempted to “pursue their own objectives and desires,
extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”335 But
textualist judges appear to have concluded that this is sometimes a risk worth accepting, because
the result of such atextual interpretation is to prevent the courts from acting at all in some range
of cases otherwise embraced by the plain terms of the jurisdictional grant. In these cases, the
impulse to limit judicial involvement altogether has prevailed over the impulse to limit judicial
discretion in interpreting statutes. Thus it is little surprise that cases in which textualist judges
have offered atextual interpretations of jurisdictional statutes in recent years have involved
statutes that purported to confer broad jurisdiction, rather than statutes that purported to deprive
the courts of jurisdiction that they previously had exercised.

2. Other Explanations

334
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To be sure, there are other plausible explanations for the account provided here of
textualists’ interpretation of jurisdictional statutes. Specifically, I consider the extent to which
the constraint of precedent, concerns for federalism or separation of powers, and results-oriented
interpretation might account for the textualists’ approach to jurisdictional statutes. I conclude,
however, that each of these explanations ultimately is not as convincing as the account provided
above, at least if textualists’ claims about their methodology are to retain any normative force.

a. The Constraint of Precedent
One possibility is the constraining force of precedent, which the Court has long found to
be particularly potent in cases involving statutory interpretation.336 After all, many of the recent
decisions finding implicit exceptions to broad statutory grants of jurisdiction rely at least in part
on older cases that initially carved out such exceptions. This certainly is the case for the wellpleaded complaint rule337 and the domestic-relations338 and probate339 exceptions to the diversity
jurisdiction.340

But stare decisis cannot fully explain the account developed here, because

textualists have been willing to take a narrow view of the constraining force of precedent when
the result would be to reduce, rather than expand, the federal courts’ jurisdiction. In Finley v.
United States,341 for example, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court declined to apply the
generous approach to federal-court jurisdiction that United Mine Workers v. Gibbs342 had applied
to a case involving pendent-claim jurisdiction. In addition, the textualists have been willing to
recognize implicit exceptions to federal jurisdiction even in cases for which there was no
obviously applicable prior case law construing the jurisdictional statute at issue.343 At best, the
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constraint of precedent can be only a partial explanation for the textualists’ selective application
of textualist approaches to jurisdictional statutes.

b. Federalism and Separation-of-Powers Concerns
Another possible explanation for the selective application of textualist methodology to
jurisdictional statutes flows from the courts’ long-standing tendency to view jurisdictional
statutes as sui generis. The exercise of jurisdiction often implicates federalism344 and separationof-powers concerns,345 and for these reasons courts346 and commentators347 have suggested that
conventional approaches to statutory interpretation might not apply—or not apply in their normal
fashion—to jurisdictional statutes. These concerns have led courts to apply various canons of
construction and judicially developed presumptions to limit the exercise of judicial power.
There is little doubt that these separation-of-powers and federalism concerns have played
an important role in judicial interpretation of jurisdictional statutes. At least since Marbury v.
Madison,348 the courts have been acutely aware of the conflict of interest inherent in courts’
interpreting of statutes that define the scope of their own power. With regard to federalism, the
Court has frequently insisted that “[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state
governments . . . requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which the statute has defined.”349 These twin concerns—the concern about judicial
aggrandizement and the desire to promote judicial federalism—have led the Court, albeit
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erratically, to insist that it should refrain from reading jurisdictional statutes “broadly”350 and
instead should “strictly constru[e]” them.351
Such canons and presumptions help to explain a general reluctance to find federal-court
jurisdiction in any case, and also explain the textualists’ insistence on strict construction of
jurisdiction-ousting statutes.

They arguably provide a basis for the domestic-relations and

probate exceptions to the diversity jurisdiction, as those are areas traditionally considered within
the cognizance of the states.352 They might also justify abstention in cases such as Tenet v.
Doe,353 which involved a claim seeking review of executive branch actions implicating national
security. Indeed, they may even lend support to a general presumption against the exercise of
jurisdiction. But these canons and presumptions, which perhaps account in part both for the
textualists’ strict construction of jurisdiction-ousting statutes and for their willingness to read
atextually statutes purporting to confer expansive jurisdiction, stand in uneasy tension with
textualists’ own claims about the importance of ensuring that courts remain faithful agents of
Congress. Although there may be powerful reasons for courts to be reluctant to find that
Congress has conferred jurisdiction, a presumption against jurisdiction—whether enforced
because of federalism concerns, separation-of-powers concerns, or other reasons—is in serious
tension with the essential textualist claims about the judicial role in statutory interpretation, at
least when the statute at issue does not, on its face, admit of exceptions. Federalism and
separation-of-powers concerns may indeed provide powerful justifications for the creation of
judicially implied exceptions to broad jurisdictional grants, but such departures from statutory
language do not seem faithful—to use some of the textualists’ favorite bromides—to the “precise
limits” that the relevant statute “has defined.”354
This is not to say that attention to federalism and separation-of-powers concerns is
irreconcilable with textualism. To the contrary, they tend to go hand in hand when Congress has
enacted a statute that limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction or divests them of jurisdiction
outright. But when Congress purports to confer jurisdiction to the limits permitted under Article
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III, reliance on federalism and separation-of-powers based presumptions substantially diminishes
the force and purity of textualism, which inhere in the courts’ treating the plain text of legislative
enactments as the only authoritative statement of statutory meaning. Indeed, Justice Scalia
himself has made this very argument.

He has professed to be generally skeptical of

“presumptions and rules of construction that load the dice for or against a particular result,”
because they not only “increase the unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of judicial
decisions” but are also arguably beyond the authority of the courts to impose.355 It may well be
true that such presumptions make statutory interpretation more rule-based356—which produces
virtues of its own357—but they are not virtues that flow necessarily from a theory of faithful
agency based on the statutory text.358 Concerns about comity and the separation of powers, in
other words, might provide powerful justifications for the approach that the Court’s textualist
Justices have taken to jurisdictional statutes. But these justifications are in substantial tension
with textualists’ claims about faithful agency as the ordering principle of the judicial role.

c. Results-Oriented Interpretation
Yet another possible explanation for the selective application of textualist methodology
to jurisdictional statutes is the realist critique that Justices are results-oriented. Many assert that
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the Court has a general antipathy to litigation,359 to plaintiffs or particular rights that they
assert,360 or to particular classes of cases, such as those within diversity jurisdiction.361 It is
possible, for example, that the Court’s textualists have been particularly stingy in their
constructions of the habeas statute because of their views about the likely substantive merits of
habeas claims. It is difficult to substantiate such an account, however, as the Court’s opinions
rarely will invoke such a ground for decision. In any event, even if such hostility is a motivating
force for the textualist drive to limit federal court jurisdiction, it is largely consistent with the
judicial-constraint account provided here. The desire to trim the courts’ docket of cases, most of
which (on this account) are unwanted, is no different in practical effect than the desire to limit
judicial authority because of concerns about the judicial role in a democratic system.362

B. Implications for Textualism
In the end, it is difficult to explain the approach of the Court’s self-professed textualists
to jurisdictional statutes without returning to textualism’s more general view about the exercise
of judicial authority. The textualist Justices’ selective application of their chosen methodology
to jurisdictional statutes suggests that textualism, at least in practice, has been less about fidelity
to Congress’s legislative supremacy and more about constraining judicial authority.
If this account is correct, it reveals something about the core defenses of textualism.
Textualists have not been shy about insisting that non-textualist approaches to statutory
interpretation are inconsistent not only with the theory of faithful agency, but also with
legislative supremacy, the concept of law, and democracy itself.363 But the jurisdictional context
reveals that these claims are at best overblown and at worst hypocritical. If self-professed
textualist judges can read broad jurisdictional statutes according to something other than their
359
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plain language, then perhaps they should temper their general insistence that government by
something other than the plain language of legislative enactments is “tyrannical.”364
Yet this account is not necessarily fatal for textualism as a methodology of statutory
interpretation. Even if textualism cannot always deliver on its promise of courts acting as
faithful agents of the legislature, it still holds a powerful normative appeal as a way to
operationalize a theory of judicial restraint.365 Indeed, the jurisdictional context suggests that the
textualist project has been more about limiting the judicial role than about faithful agency. But
the account developed here should force defenders of textualism to acknowledge that, at least
sometimes, the methodology does no better than other approaches to statutory interpretation at
ensuring the faithful agency of the courts.

It may well be that textualism nevertheless is

defensible, but its proponents must be willing to argue that the desire to limit judicial authority is
a sufficiently compelling end that the sacrifice to the notion of faithful agency is justified.366
The account presented here also has implications for textualists’ claims that their
approach is superior to others at constraining judicial mischief.367 Justice Scalia, for example,
has warned that the threat of non-textualist approaches to statutory interpretation is that “under
the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”368 Of course, whether textualism
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succeeds more generally as a constraining device is a question of substantial controversy,369 as
the textualists’ claims are not easily testable without choosing some baseline—such as text,
intent, or purpose, which of course assumes the conclusion—from which to measure deviation.
But in the jurisdictional context, one could at least argue that the textualists’ claims or constraint
are vindicated in practice. Indeed, in one sense, a consistently applied presumption against
jurisdiction might well help to reduce judicial discretion, in the sense that judges who are less
likely to act at all are, a fortiori, less likely to act instrumentally.
This, however, is a difficult claim to sustain. First, the contention that there is little room
for judicial mischief when judges conclude that they lack jurisdiction to proceed ignores the
threshold interpretive question—whether Congress has, in fact, stripped the courts of jurisdiction
to act. If the jurisdictional statute is more properly read to authorize jurisdiction—either because
the language is susceptible to more than one interpretation, because Congress did not intend to
divest the courts of jurisdiction, or for some other reason—then the court’s refusal to entertain an
action itself might amount to a form of judicial mischief.

Second, the textualist judges’

willingness to abstain from exercising jurisdiction that Congress appears, in light of the plain text
of an enactment, to have conferred seems quite similar to the tendency that textualists regularly
decry—the inclination of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress.
To be sure, the aim of such an interpretive approach may well be in the service of judicial
minimalism. But that does not mean that it is not a form of judicial willfulness. In some cases,
Congress plausibly has attempted to confer jurisdiction in order to promote some policy goal by
using the tool of litigation, and judicial refusal to participate frustrates the legislative judgment.
And even if one assumes that judicial abstention is always policy-neutral, it is at least
inconsistent with the notion of faithful agency and legislative supremacy. The merits of those
ideas may well be debatable.370 But if textualists continue to assert that their approach is
uniquely consistent with faithful agency and legislative supremacy, it is fair to evaluate textualist
judges’ actual decision-making according to the extent to which it advances them.

C. Implications for the Congressional-Control Model of Federal Jurisdiction
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Chief Justice Marshall famously argued that the federal courts “have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution.”371 But the account developed above suggests
that in practice, textualist judges have been substantially more willing “to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given” than “to usurp that which is not.”
The long-standing debate about Congress’s power to control the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. But because textualism—particularly as
applied in practice—has been largely about the courts’ relationship to Congress, the rise of
textualism is important to the ongoing debate, at least as a positive matter.372 The tendency of
the Court’s textualists to construe jurisdiction-ousting statutes more strictly than jurisdictionconferring statutes suggests that although the textualists have accepted the strong congressionalcontrol model for jurisdiction-stripping, they see a substantially more robust role for the federal
courts on the abstention side of the debate. And any consideration of Congress’s power to
control the jurisdiction of the federal courts must account for the Supreme Court’s active role in
effectively limiting the jurisdiction of those courts.373 At least as a positive matter, David
Shapiro’s view that courts ought to exercise discretion in deciding whether there should be
jurisdiction in a particular case—and not Redish’s visions of absolute legislative supremacy—
appears to have prevailed.374
To be sure, virtually all of the cases discussed above relate to congressional control over
lower-court jurisdiction; Congress has rarely put the Court squarely to the test of addressing the
mandatory scope of its appellate jurisdiction or the extent of Congress’s power under the

371

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
In offering thoughts about the implications of textualism in practice, I take to heart Cass Sunstein’s admonition
that normative questions about the proper judicial role in statutory interpretation cannot be comprehensively
addressed without attention to pragmatic questions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1999); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 56, at 382–83:
(arguing that “simple appeals to democracy or structure set forth in a constitution (federal or state) for the enactment
of legislation cannot itself answer the question of the appropriate judicial role”).
373
See Weinberg, supra note 112, at 1408–09 (“The Supreme Court is by far the more active source of door-closing
rules in constitutional and other federal cases. . . . [T]he Court’s door-closing jurisprudence must, however
imperfectly, be relevant to any consideration of Congress’s door-closing powers.”).
374
See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 7, at 574–75 (“[A]s experience and tradition teach, the
question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not
impossible, to answer in gross. And the courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning
than is the legislature.”).
372

63

Exceptions Clause,375 and any suggestion about how the Court’s textualists would respond is
mere speculation.376

But the textualists’ approach to jurisdictional statutes more generally

suggests that their concern about limiting federal judicial power would lead most textualists to
advance a strong congressional-control model for the Exceptions Clause, as well.
We need not speculate, however, about the textualists’ views about the power of the
courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has granted. As demonstrated
above, although the rise of textualism has had a pronounced effect on the strictness with which
the Court’s textualists interpret jurisdiction-ousting statutes, the Court’s textualists have not
similarly insisted consistently on strict obeisance to Congress’s instructions in statutes conferring
expansive jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the rise of textualism—or perhaps because of it—
Congress’s power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it appears, turns at least in part
on Congress’s willingness to further the project of limiting judicial authority.

CONCLUSION
Textualists have in many respects redefined the debate about the appropriate judicial role
in matters of statutory interpretation. In so doing, they have also shaped the debate about the
proper relationship between Congress and the federal courts. Although textualists speak with
confidence about the courts’ role as faithful agents of Congress, application of the approach in
practice to jurisdictional statutes has suggested that the textualist view of the judiciary’s
relationship to Congress is somewhat more ambivalent. The notion of faithful agency, it turns
out, risks increasing judicial authority, when Congress seeks to confer it; but textualism, in both
theory and practice, has been largely focused on limiting judicial authority. And when faithful
agency has conflicted with the urge to limit judicial power, the latter has prevailed.
As a positive matter, this suggests that the answer to the question of the extent of
Congress’s control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts varies depending on whether
375
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Congress seeks to grant authority to the federal courts or instead to deprive them of it. This is
certainly not an indefensible view of the long-standing question of the congressional role in
crafting a jurisdictional regime. But it is not the view that one might expect as the product of
strict adherence to textualism, with its insistence on the faithful-agent model of the courts. If
indeed textualism is more about constraining judicial authority than it is about faithful agency, its
proponents should develop a normative defense of the approach that acknowledges those
objectives and accounts for the attendant theoretical costs. A richer account of textualism can
only advance the project of understanding the courts’ relationship to Congress, and in so doing
can help us to develop a fuller account of the extent of Congress’s authority to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Until then, we must take textualists’ most sweeping claims
with a grain of salt.
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